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"WHODUNIT" VERSUS "WHAT WAS DONE":
WHEN TO ADMIT CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL CASES
SHERRY F. COLB*

In virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, the law of
evidence prohibitsparties from offering proof of an individual's
general charactertraits to suggest that, on a specific occasion, the
individual behaved in a manner consistent with those traits. In a
criminal trial in particular, the law prohibits a prosecutor's
introduction of evidence about the defendant's characteras proof
of his guilt. In this Article, Professor Colb proposes that the
exclusion of defendant character evidence is appropriatein one
category of cases but inappropriate in another. In the first
category, which Professor Colb calls "whodunit" cases, the parties
agree that a crime was committed but disagreeover whether it was
the defendant who carriedout the crime. In such cases, character
evidence about the defendant ought to be excluded, because the
defendant's salience in the courtroom may make his character
traits appearfar more damning than they actually are, given the
many "bad" people outside the courtroom who could have
committed the offense. In "what was done" cases, by contrast,the
prosecutor and defense agree that the defendant was involved in
the transaction being litigated but disagree over whether his role
was criminal. In such cases, character evidence about the
defendant is not misleading, because there is no potential third
party with the same trait who could have committed the offense:
either the defendant did it or no one did. In these cases, the
defendant's character traits can help the jury determine what
happened. Professor Colb demonstrates that the "whodunit"
versus "what was done" dichotomy also provides a way of
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determining when evidence of a victim's charactertraits ought to
be admissible. In particular,Professor Colb explores the interplay
between her dichotomy and the rape shield laws, which exclude
victim promiscuity evidence in rape cases. She concludes that
because of a concept she develops and terms "conditional
irrelevance," promiscuity evidence is irrelevant in rape cases and
ought to be excludedfor that reason.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1991 William Kennedy Smith stood trial for the rape of Patty
Bowman.' Bowman testified that Smith had raped her on the lawn
near his house.2 Smith acknowledged that he and Bowman had
sexual intercourse, but he maintained that it was consensual.' Though
three women separately came forward and told of being raped or
sexually assaulted by Smith, the judge refused to allow them to testify

1. John R. Hicks, Prosecution Case Hinges on Alleged Victim's Testimony, UNITED
PRESS INT. (N.Y.), Dec. 8, 1991, available at LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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at trial.4 The reason for this refusal was the propensity rule or
"character rule,"5 and Smith was subsequently acquitted.6
The evidentiary ruling in the Smith trial is noteworthy for two
reasons. First, it dramatizes the application of a rule that, in one form
7
The rule
or another, binds most courts in the United States.
prohibits the introduction of character evidence to prove that an
individual acted in conformity with his character on the occasion in
question. 8 Second, the Smith evidence ruling appears to have played
a role in motivating a legal reform-namely, the passage of Federal
9
Rules of Evidence 413-415 and some analogous state law rules.
These rules carve- out exceptions to the character rule in cases of rape
and child molestation. Apart from these crime-specific exceptions,

4. David Margolick, Why Jury in Smith Case Never Heard From 3 Other Women,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, at B14; Anna Quindlen, Truth and Consequences in Palm
Beach, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 1991, at A27.
5. See FLA.STAT. ANN. § 90.404 (West 2000).
6. Verdicts in West Palm Beach, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, at A38.
7. See 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE T-1, T-34 to T-39 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)
(noting that "[f]orty-one states ... have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in various
forms" and listing the corresponding state versions of Rule 404, the character rule).
8. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 404. Rule 404(a) provides: Evidence of a person's character
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion .... ." FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Most state jurisdictions
have either adopted the federal rule or drafted similar versions of their own. See 6
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 7, at T-34-T-39.
9. Jeffrey Waller, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: "Laws Are Like
Medicine; They Generally Cure An Evil By A Lesser... Evil," 30 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1503, 1505--06 (1999) (noting that outrage against the Smith ruling contributed to the
drafting of Rules 413-415); see also David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensityand Probability
in Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 15 (1994) (discussing the
then proposed Rules 413-415). Karp states that "[p]ublic attention ha[d] been focused on
this issue by the William Kennedy Smith case in Florida," although he notes that "the
proposal for reform ...pre-date[d] that particular case." Id. Karp was, at the time he
wrote the article, Senior Counsel, Office of Policy Development, United States
Department of Justice. Id.
A few states have adopted legislation similar to Federal Rules of Evidence 413415. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1108 (West Supp. 2001) (permitting the admission of a
defendant's prior sexual offenses); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-15 (Michie 1998) (admitting
evidence of similar crimes in prosecutions for child molestation, incest, and conspiracy to
commit child molestation or incest); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.025 (1999), amended by S.B.
757 (Mo. 2000) (permitting evidence of prior similar crimes in prosecutions for crimes
involving victims under the age of fourteen). Some of these state rules have run into
problems. The Indiana rule was declared a nullity by a state court decision, although it is
apparently still on the books. See Day v. State, 643 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
The prior version of the Missouri rule was declared unconstitutional by a state court.
State v. Bums, 978 S.W.2d 759, 760-62 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). It remains to be seen
whether the amended version of the rule will pass muster under the state constitution.
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however, the character rule remains in force and accordingly limits

the use of propensity evidence in all federal and most state courts.
The federal sex-crime exceptions to the propensity rule 10 have
encountered considerable scholarly opposition from the time that
they were first proposed.1' Supporters of the character rule argue
that no principled distinction between accused sexual offenders and
other classes of defendants justifies such disparate treatment. Even
commentators who generally oppose the character rule have criticized
Congress for passing crime-specific exceptions to it.13 According to
10. Rule 413 states in part that "[iln a criminal case in which the defendant is accused
of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense
or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant." FED. R. EVID. 413(a). Rule 414 states in part that "[iun a
criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child molestation,
evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of child
molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it
is relevant." FED. R. EVID. 414(a). Rule 415 provides a similar exception for civil cases.
FED. R. EVID. 415.
11. See Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? MotivationalEvidence and Relevancy in
Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563,565 (1997) (describing Rule 413 as unjustifiable on the
basis of feminist theory); Joseph A. Aluise, Note, Evidence of PriorSexual Misconduct in
Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Proceedings: Did Congress Err in Passing Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415?, 14 J.L. & POL. 153, 195 (1998) (arguing that Rules
413-415 depart from the normal ban on "propensity evidence" on the basis of an
unsubstantiated belief that rapists and child molesters represent a special class of
defendants more likely than other criminals to re-offend). In addition, the Federal
Judicial Conference opposed the amendments. Judicial Conference of the United States,
Report of the Judicial Conference on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain
Sexual Misconduct Cases, reprintedin 159 F.R.D. 51, 52-54 (1995) (expressing misgivings
about the proposed rules); see also Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You
Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due
Process Clause,28 LOY.U. CHI. L.J. 1, 2 (1996) ("Recent scholarship suggests that many
judges, law professors, and lawyers strongly oppose [Rules 413-415]."); Erik D. Ojala,
Note, Propensity Evidence Under Rule 413: The Need for Balance,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 947,
950 (1999) (noting that Rules 413-415 "have been the subject of much criticism and
debate" and that they, according to many commentators, "undermine the integrity and
rationality of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
12. See Baker, supra note 11, at 565; Leonore MJ.Simon, The Myth of Sex Offender
Specialization: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
387, 401 (1997) (concluding, based on empirical evidence, that past sex offenders are no
more likely to commit future sex offenses than past robbers are to commit future
robberies, and that, therefore, it is unfair to single out sex offenders as recidivists); Aluise,
supra note 11, at 195.
13. See Kenneth J. Melilli, The CharacterEvidence Rule Revisited, 1998 BYU L. REv.
1547, 1587-90, 1626 (1998) (claiming that the character rule is never justified because it is
based purely on a mistrust of juries, and asserting that specific crimes should not be
distinguished by how easy or difficult they are to prosecute); see also James S. Liebman,
Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Problems and Recommendations, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 753, 756 (1995) (noting that "to retain the general presumption of
inadmissibility, but then make mandatorily admissible two of the largest categories of such

2001]

ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

appropriate reform would abolish the
such commentators, a more
14
character rule altogether.
In this Article, I propose an innovation that would impose order
and logic on what is currently a complicated and largely arbitrary
approach to propensity evidence. 15 I submit that different categories
of criminal cases do indeed call for distinct rules regarding propensity
evidence. I therefore reject the all-or-nothing approach to propensity
evidence that would deem Rules 413-415 to be misguided simply for
treating some cases differently from others. I argue, however, that
Rules 413-415 do not draw the right distinctions. In place of the
sexual versus nonsexual crime divide embraced by these rules, I
propose a rule that would exclude character evidence against
defendants in what I call "whodunit" cases and admit character
evidence against defendants in what I call "what was done" cases.
In the typical "whodunit" scenario, both the prosecution and the
defense acknowledge that a crime has been committed. They
disagree only about the identity of the criminal. In these cases, I
propose that the character rule protecting the defendant should apply
regardless of the crime. In the "what was done" scenario, by contrast,
the prosecution and defense agree that the defendant was involved in
the transaction being litigated. The controversial question is whether
or not the defendant's involvement was criminal. The category of
consent-defense rape cases represents one, though not the only,
example of the "what was done" scenario. In "what was done" cases,
I propose that character evidence against the defendant ought to be
admissible.
In addition to helping us determine whether to admit propensity
evidence against a criminal defendant, I show that the "whodunit"
versus "what was done" dichotomy also provides a useful way to
distinguish those cases in which the defense should be allowed to
evidence-is to deprive the rules of any coherent rationale").
14. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American
CharacterEvidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the
Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 301-02 (1995) (supporting limited
experimentation with the repeal of the character evidence prohibition but arguing that
Rules 413-415 are inappropriate starting points); Melilli, supra note 13, at 1621-26; Mary
Katherine Danna, Note, The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Prejudice of
PoliticsorJust Plain Common Sense?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 277,309 (1996) ("[C]ontrary to
what some critics contend, it appears that [Rules 413-415] are not misguided because they
permit prior misconduct evidence in sex offense cases, but because they make an
insupportable distinction between sex offenses and other violent crimes.").
15. See generally Richard C. Wydick, Character Evidence: A Guided Tour of the
Grotesque Structure, 21 U.C. DAvIs L. REV.123, 123-95 (1987) (discussing the structure
of the character rule).
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offer victim propensity evidence from those in which it should not. In
doing so, I evaluate the rape shield law, which excludes victim sexual
propensity evidence and accordingly might appear to conflict with my
basic proposal for victim evidence in "what was done" cases. I reject
some existing scholarly defenses of the rape shield law. I nonetheless
conclude that, because of a logical construct that I call "conditional
irrelevance," the probative value of sexual propensity evidence for
determining consent on a particular occasion essentially vanishes
once a complaint of rape has been lodged. I demonstrate through a
series of examples that, once a person has made a rape complaint, her
propensity for dishonesty or treachery-rather than her disposition
for consenting to sex-becomes decisive.
After developing and illustrating the merit of the "whodunit"
versus "what was done" categorization of character evidence, I offer a
provisional account of why juries might be inclined to overconvict in
"whodunit" cases and underconvict in "what was done" cases and
explore how my proposal might help to ameliorate these systemic
distortions.
I. THE CHARACTER RULE

Before more thoroughly examining my proposal for eliminating
the propensity rule16 in the "what was done" category of cases, it is
important to understand in basic terms what the character rule
currently requires. The rule limits the use of "character evidence"-evidence that consists of facts about some enduring trait of an
individual. Such evidence is excluded when offered in support of the
claim that the individual's actions on a specific occasion conformed
with her character. Prohibited character evidence might include the
testimony of a character witness about the stinginess, cruelty, or
violence of a criminal defendant, as well as17evidence of specific acts
proffered in support of the same conclusion.
16. I shall use the phrases "the character rule," "the propensity rule," and "the Rule"
interchangeably, to denote the rule prohibiting the introduction of character evidence in
support of the inference that the person possessed of such a character acted in a manner
consistent with that character at a particular time. See FED. R. EVID. 404. I do not
evaluate here the use of prior misconduct evidence for "other purposes," such as
demonstrating "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident" pursuant to Rule 404(b). Id. at 404(b).
17. Though there are preferred and disfavored methods of proving character when
character evidence is admissible, see FED. R. EVID. 405(a), this Article addresses only the
preliminary admissibility question. There is a separate debate over the forms that any
admissible character evidence should take. Compare Christopher Bopst, Rape Shield
Laws and PriorFalse Accusations of Rape: The Need for Meaningful Legislative Reform,
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Consider the following illustration of the character rule. The
prosecution in a murder case wishes to offer evidence that the
defendant has committed violent crimes in the past. On the basis of
his criminal history, the prosecution plans to argue that the defendant
is more likely to have committed the murder of which he now stands
accused.18 The propensity rule bars this evidentiary move (subject to
certain exceptions). 19 The rule rests on the foundational principle
that people should be held accountable for what they do rather than
for who they are °
24 J. LEGIS. 125, 127 (1998) (proposing the admission in rape cases of extrinsic evidence of
the complainant's specific prior false rape accusations, after the defendant has made a
preliminary showing of their falsity), with Denise R. Johnson, Prior False Allegations of
Rape: Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus?, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 243, 243-45 (1995)
(arguing that extrinsic evidence of a rape complainant's prior false accusations of rape
should not necessarily be admissible to prove her insincerity).
18. In addition to a criminal defendant, any person whose actions are relevant to a
particular litigation could theoretically be the subject of character evidence. This would
include parties to the litigation or someone who has harmed (or been harmed by) one of
the parties, such as the victim of a homicide.
19. For the general rule, see FED. R. EVID. 404(a). The exceptions and exclusions
provided in Rule 404 are as follows:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused
offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607,608, and 609....
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident ....
FED. R. EVID. 404.
Rule 405 provides:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait
of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to
reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination,
inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct.
FED. R. EVID. 405.
20. See David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition:
Foundations of the Rule Against Trial By Character,73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1162 (1998) ("One
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Defenders of the character rule do not argue that a defendant's
violent character is completely irrelevant to a determination of
whether he has committed a homicide 1 Indeed, if evidence of

character were truly irrelevant, then we would need no special rule
barring its admission. 2 Supporters of the character rule argue that,
notwithstanding its relevance, we should exclude character evidence
because jurors tend to give it undue weight. Such jurors might
convict on a flimsy factual record because of a defendant's prior

criminal history.23 In our homicide trial example, a jury might assume
that the defendant is guilty of the murder-given his criminal
history-and not pay adequate attention to the strength or weakness

of the evidence specific to this case. Another concern is that the
jurors might decide to punish the defendant for being bad, even if

24
they believe that he is innocent of the charged criminal conduct.

of the oldest principles of Anglo-American law is that a person 'should not be judged
strenuously by reference to the awesome spectre of his past life.'" (quoting M.C. Slough
& J. William Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IOWA L. REV. 325, 325 (1956))).
Contra Sherry F. Colb, The Characterof Freedom, 52 STAN. L. REv. 235, 248-49 (1999)
(suggesting that notwithstanding evidentiary rules to the contrary, our society's vision of
criminal culpability is very much tied to conclusions about whether or not an individual
charged with an offense was driven by a malevolent character).
21. David P. Leonard, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 310 (1995) (" 'The inquiry [into character] is not rejected
because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a
fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.' " (quoting Michelson v. United
States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948))); Waller, supra note 9, at 1532 ("[T]he [Supreme]
Court has stated that the danger of admitting character evidence is not irrelevance; rather,
the danger is that the jury may give too much weight to the evidence and prejudge the
defendant."); see also Michael S. Ellis, Comment, The Politics Behind FederalRules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 961, 978-80 (1998) (noting that
evidence of prior acts often has been thought to be relevant to prove conduct, but
contending that it is too prejudicial and should thus be excluded under the character rule).
22. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (excluding all irrelevant evidence).
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, A
Small Contributionto the Debate Over the ProposedLegislationAbolishing the Character
Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1125, 1138
(1993) ("In sum, there is a risk that the lay jurors will overestimate the probative value of
character as a predictor of conduct."); Roger C. Park & David P. Bryden, Uncharged
Misconduct Evidence in Sex Crime Cases: Reassessing the Rule of Exclusion, 141 MIL. L.
REV. 171, 196-97 (1993) ("The jury may decide to convict even if it believes the defendant
innocent, or it may treat the evidence about the charged incident with abandon, because it
believes the defendant to be a bad person who deserves to be punished whether or not
technically guilty of the charged crime."); Waller, supra note 9, at 1510 ("The major
concern of all parties in the legal system is the possibility that the propensity evidence may
persuade the jury to convict the defendant based upon the defendant's past actions and
not the current crime.").
24. See Natali & Stigall, supra note 11, at 11-12 (noting that courts often exclude
propensity evidence because of the danger that jurors will convict the defendant because
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Finally, after learning about a defendant's bad character, the jurors
might be less concerned about the possibility of convicting an

innocent person and thus less vigilant about properly applying the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to the evidence.2 To prevent

such actions, we shield the jury from information that we fear might
cloud its judgment2 6
Critics of the propensity rule traditionally have argued for its
abolition, 27 while the rule's supporters have urged its fortification by
narrowing its exceptions or by curtailing allowances for "specific acts"
evidence offered to prove something other than character. 8 After the
he or she is a "bad person").
25. See John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the FactfindingProcess, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065, 1073-78 (1968).
26. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Some Comments About Mr. David Karp's Remarks on
Propensity Evidence, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37, 42 (1994) ("[T]he underlying assumption
of the American character evidence prohibition is that lay triers of fact will misuse
character testimony ...."); see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT, CASES AND PROBLEMS 1 (4th ed.
2000) (citing mistrust of juries as the "single overriding reason for the law of evidence").
27. See, e.g., Melilli, supra note 13, at 1620-21 (concluding that "character evidence
cannot and should not be banished from the field of proof"); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence
of Characterto Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 845,890 (1982) (same).
28. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases,78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 544, 551 (1994) (arguing against the often-pretextual use of
Rule 404 "motive" or "intent" as a loophole for propensity evidence); see also Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's UnchargedMisconduct to Prove Mens
Rea: The Doctrines that Threaten to Engulf the CharacterEvidence Prohibition,130 MnL.
L. REV. 41, 44-45 (1990) (discussing two doctrines that permit prosecutors to offer
uncharged crime evidence against the defendant to prove mens rea). Professor
Imwinkelried argues that such allowances "may substantially undermine the character
evidence prohibition" and argues for their elimination in order to preserve the character
rule. Id.; see also Leonard, supra note 20, at 1181-201 (tracing the historical,
philosophical, and religious justifications for the ban on character evidence and concluding
that fear is the reason that the character rule is under attack). He argues:
The more people come to see society as composed of predators and victims, the
more likely it is that legislatures will adopt rules designed to protect the latter
from the evils of the former. The so-far partial abrogation of the character ban is
emblematic of this trend. Respect for the traditions of American law and for the
principle that its institutions should reflect our highest aspirations demand that
that trend be reversed.
Leonard, supra note 20, at 1215; see also Miguel A. M6ndez & Edward J. Imwinkelried,
People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for
Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473,
474 (1995) (criticizing the use of prior acts evidence to prove certain things other than
character, and noting that "[p]rosecutors favor uncharged misconduct evidence precisely
because they know that it is one of 'the most prejudicial [types of] evidence imaginable'"
(quoting People v. Smallwood, 722 P.2d 197, 205 (1986))); Abraham P. Ordover,
Balancingthe Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38
EMORY L.J. 135, 135-36 (1989) (arguing for rules limiting the admission of evidence of
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1994 passage of the rules creating a rapist and child-molester
exception to the federal character rule,2 9 scholars began to question
whether it is indeed appropriate to exempt some categories of
criminal offenses from the general character rules." Professors Roger
Park and David Bryden, for example, have defended the notion that
at least in consent-defense rape prosecutions, courts ought to admit
evidence of a defendant's propensity for sexual assault, as Rule 413
3
would permit them to do, because such evidence is highly probative. '
This Article contends that the distinction between "whodunit"
and "what was done" cases provides a more principled basis for
deciding when to apply the propensity rule than does the distinction

between sexual and non-sexual offenses. In support of this
hypothesis, the next part elaborates how the structure of the "what
was done" scenario renders propensity evidence about the defendant
both more probative of guilt and less likely to cause unfair prejudice
than it would be under the "whodunit" scenario.
II. THE CATEGORIES: "WHODUNIT" VERSUS "WHAT WAS DONE"
In a criminal trial, the prosecutor must carry the burden of
proving both identity-that the defendant is the person who carried
32
out the crime-and actus reus-that a criminal act was carried out.
Thus, in theory, every trial implicates both "whodunit" and "what was
Ordinarily, however, a defendant actively
done" concerns.
prior bad acts to prove something other than character due to the limited ability of jurors
to distinguish between the improper and proper purposes of Rule 404(b)).
29. See FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
30. See, e.g., Sherry L. Scott, Comment, Fairness to the Victim: Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414 Admit Propensity Evidence in Sexual Offender Trials, 35 HOUs. L.
REv. 1729, 1741-42 (1999) (asserting that consideration of highly recidivist crimes may
provide a justification for admitting propensity evidence); Danna, supra note 14, at 309
(concluding that Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 are based on a "sound premise" but
that admissibility of prior crimes evidence should be expanded to cover the whole
category of "violent crimes").
31. See Bryden & Park, supra note 28, at 555; see also Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging
the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 359, 381 (1996) (calling Rules 413-415 "groundbreaking in their
direct approval of admitting uncharged acts for the explicit purpose of propensity and
disposition" and advocating similar exceptions for domestic violence prosecutions); Scott,
supra note 30, at 1742 ("Propensity evidence should be allowed in sex crime cases even
though it otherwise would be inadmissible to prove guilt in trials for other highly recidivist
crimes."); Waller, supra note 9, at 1550 ("The new rules [Rules 413-415] represent a
necessary change in the legal maneuvering that was required under Rule 404(b) when
trying a case involving sexual misconduct.").
32. Actus reus is defined as "[tihe wrongful deed that comprises the physical
components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish
criminal liability; a forbidden act." BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 37 (7th ed. 1999).
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controverts only one of these two elements and essentially stipulates
to the other. In the "whodunit" case, a crime has obviously been
committed. An armed man has entered a bank in a ski mask, for
example, and ordered all customers to freeze while directing bank
employees to hand over cash. The attorneys prosecuting such a case
do not need to spend much time establishing that the masked person
in the bank violated the criminal law. Prosecutors can instead focus
their efforts on showing that it was the defendant, rather than
someone else, who carried out this unquestionably criminal act.
In the "what was done" case, in contrast, there is no dispute
about identity. The defendant was involved in the transaction at issue
in the case. What divides the prosecutor and defense counsel in such
cases is the question of what exactly the defendant did and under
what circumstances. Perhaps the defendant in a homicide case claims
to have killed his victim justifiably in self-defense. The answer to the
"what was done" question will generally turn on some combination of
the defendant's state of mind during the offense-mens real-and
what the victim of the alleged crime did immediately beforehand.
A defendant on trial for aggravated assault' might claim that the
victim attacked first and thereby placed him in reasonable fear for his
own safety. In such a case, the prosecution need not convince the
jury that it was the defendant rather than some third party who
injured the victim. The prosecution can instead concentrate on
33. Whether a defendant may stipulate to an element of a crime raises a controversial
issue. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997) (holding that, although the
prosecution is generally entitled to "prove its case by evidence of its own choice" and is
not automatically bound by the defendant's proffered stipulations, the stipulation offered
should have been accepted under Rule 403). Because the prosecution bears the burden of
persuasion on every element as a matter of due process, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970), the defendant-in the absence of a guilty plea-arguably may not withdraw
any issue from the jury's consideration. In practical terms, however, there are situations in
which, absent evidence to the contrary, it is logical to conclude from proof establishing one
element that another element is established as well. One example is a homicide case in
which the prosecution proves that the defendant held a gun to the victim's head and fired
four times and that the victim died of four gunshot wounds. Although the defendant
might have believed that the gun was not loaded and meant only to scare the victim,
absent evidence to this effect, it would be eminently reasonable for the jury to conclude
that the defendant intended to kill the victim.
34. Mens rea is defined as "[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a
conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or
recklessness." BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 999 (7th ed. 1999).
35. The Model Penal Code defines aggravated assault as occurring when a person:
"(a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely,
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to
another with a deadly weapon." MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (Official Draft 1962).
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demonstrating to the jury that the defendant's actions were not taken
in response to any threatening conduct by the victim.
In short, most cases present either the "whodunit" or the "what
was done" scenario, but not both. What role should character
evidence play in each? In the "what was done" scenario, the
defendant's violent tendencies increase the plausibility of the
prosecutor's claim that the defendant, without justification, initiated
violence against the victim. Under the "whodunit" scenario, of
course, the defendant's propensity for engaging in the charged
conduct also increases the apparent odds of his guilt. Past violence,
after all, is an important predictor of future violence.36 Propensity
evidence in the "whodunit" context, however, changes the apparent
odds of guilt primarily by placing the defendant in a narrower
universe of potential culprits, those who are more likely than the rest
of the population to act in the manner charged. What propensity
evidence will not do is tell us which of the many people who share this
propensity committed this offense. In the "what was done" scenario,
in contrast, there is no need to narrow down the universe of potential
culprits. If there was a crime, then the criminal will be found in the

courtroom.
Consider the case of the defendant who is charged with robbing a
Wells Fargo bank in downtown Los Angeles. This defendant, as it
turns out, has robbed banks on several occasions in the past. In trying
to determine who committed this specific robbery, it is useful to know

that the defendant is a robber. The police, for example, can look for
a suspect among the population of known robbers. Roger Park calls
this technique "rounding up the usual suspects." 37

This strategy

36. See R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 50, 50 (1998) ("Those offenders most likely to reoffend have
been identified by risk factors such as a history of criminal behavior .. ");see also Deidre
Klassen & William A. O'Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictorsof Violence in Adult
Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 154 (1988) ("Past violent
behavior as measured by arrests has shown a strong relationship to future violence.").
Klassen and O'Connor's study indicates that 59.3% of subjects predicted to be violent on
the basis of past violent behavior were actually violent in the future. Id at 152; see also
JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICrING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 104-05 (1981) ("If there is one
finding that overshadows all others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of
future crime increases with each prior criminal act."). Contra Aviva Orenstein, No Bad
Men!: A Feminist Analysis of CharacterEvidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663,
670 (1998) ("People are not predictable characters; many question whether we can reliably
determine how someone behaved on one particular occasion by reviewing his or her past
deeds.").
37. Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evidence:
Congress Was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 273
(1995) (borrowing from CASABLANCA (Warner Studios 1943)).
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reduces the amount of investigative work necessary to track down a
viable suspect. Once a defendant is ready to stand trial for the
robbery, however, his membership in the category of people who
have robbed before is of more limited value. It may tell us that
because the defendant is in the class of "robbers," it is more probable
that he committed the crime than that a member of the population at
large, including robbers and non-robbers, did. Those persons inclined
to commit robbery, however, are plentiful. Knowing that the
defendant is one of them does not convey information about which of
the many existing robbers carried out this robbery. 8
Though the "whodunit" defendant's criminal history has very
little probative value at trial, it nonetheless has the potential to
prejudice the defendant's case greatly. Out of the universe of
possible culprits-people who are inclined to commit robberies-the
jury sees only one person, the defendant. When the jury learns of this
one visible person's propensity for committing robberies, the
defendant's salience in the courtroom makes his propensity appear to
distinguish him from the crowd. This appearance is deceptive, but
can nonetheless influence the jury's evaluation of the evidence. The
reality is that the police most probably focused their investigative
attention on the defendant at least in part because of his prior
criminal record. It is thus no coincidence that someone with a
criminal record is sitting in the defendant's seat. Propensity evidence
in "whodunit" cases is therefore even less telling than it might seem at
first glance.
The "what was done" scenario is quite different. The entire class
of potential culprits is in the courtroom. The jury must determine
what the victim and the defendant did in their interaction, not
whether the true culprit was actually some absent third-party.
Consider the case of a defendant involved in a barroom fight with a
man sitting on the neighboring barstool. Assume that the defendant
concedes that he injured the victim but claims that he was acting in
self-defense. Under these circumstances, learning that the defendant
is predisposed to behave violently does not misleadingly divert
attention away from an invisible class of potential culprits who share
the defendant's predisposition. In this setting, knowing of the

38. Additionally complicating this story, it is far from certain that a convicted robber
carried out this offense. Every robber has to have a first time, and this robbery could be
someone's first. Furthermore, many repeat robbers have been successful at evading
capture and therefore would not necessarily even register as robbers in the prosecutor's
data bank.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

defendant's predisposition makes the prosecutor's version of what
occurred when the defendant injured the victim more plausible.
Conversely, learning that the victim is predisposed to behave
violently makes more plausible the defendant's version of events. Yet
under the current law, the jury would hear about the defendant's
violent predisposition only if the defense first offered evidence of
either the victim's violent predisposition or the defendant's
peacefulness.3 9 This creates an evidentiary disparity between the
admissibility of equivalent evidence. The law readily admits "bad
victim" character evidence while significantly impeding the admission
of "bad defendant" character evidence. This disparity might account
for the difficulty of obtaining convictions in such assault cases. 40
Admitting anti-defendant predisposition evidence in "what was
done" cases could help correct this problem, a problem that is in no
way dictated by due process or the presumption of innocence. A
defendant does not have the right to exclude relevant evidence simply
because it is highly relevant and therefore damaging to the
defendant's prospects for an acquittal.
In sum, defendant character evidence should be inadmissible in
"whodunit" cases, while both defendant and victim character
evidence should generally be admissible in "what was done" cases. Is
this reform practical? It would appear to be. A judge could decide
39. This is because the character rule provides an exception for pertinent victim
character traits when introduced by the defendant, but does not provide an exception for
pertinent defendant character traits when introduced by the prosecutor. See FED. R.
EVID. 404(a)(1).
Once the defense has offered bad character evidence about the victim, the
prosecution may offer "evidence of the same trait of character of the accused." Id. Under
the amendment allowing for such evidence as of December 1, 2000, the rule more closely
approximates my approach, by admitting bad character evidence about a defendant when
the defense has offered bad character evidence about the victim (pertinent only in "what
was done" cases, as explained infra note 52 and accompanying text). The rule still fails,
however, to allow for the introduction of anti-defendant character evidence when such
evidence would be most informative-when there is no "bad victim" character evidence
for the defense to offer (and hence no opportunity for the prosecution to introduce
parallel "bad defendant" character evidence).
40. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the CriminalJustice System, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1324 (1997). The authors obtained firsthand accounts of
proof problems similar to those encountered in the acquaintance rape context by
interviewing "several veteran criminal lawyers" and asking them to "[n]ame some crimes
where it is difficult to obtain a conviction because the only strong evidence is the victim's
testimony, thus reducing the trial to a swearing contest." The authors also requested that
the lawyers "recall the usual outcome of such cases in their own experiences. All the
lawyers named nonsexual assault as a crime where swearing contests often occur. One
defense attorney observed that such cases, 'generally involve a race to the courthouse
where whoever wins is the "victim .... Id.
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whether to classify a case as "whodunit" or "what was done," based
on evidentiary arguments prior to trial. Her decision would then pave
the way for further evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of
character evidence.
An opponent might raise the concern that under this scheme, the
defendant who has heretofore conceded involvement in the
transaction at issue, contesting only that it was criminal, might now
simply challenge both the proposition that there was a crime and the
proposition that he was involved, in order to thwart the admissibility
of character evidence in "what was done" cases. The response to this
concern is that the defense has always had an incentive to challenge
every possible element of the prosecution's case, because proving
both that there was a crime and that the defendant committed that
crime theoretically requires more work than proving only one or the
other. Yet, we do not hear of many cases in which defense attorneys
argue to the jury that "not only has the prosecution not proven that
my client was at all involved in the transaction at issue, but it has also
failed to prove that whoever was involved committed any crime
against the victim." The reason for this is simple. A defense attorney
who denies the obvious loses credibility with the jury.
Consider why the dual ("whodunit" and "what was done")
defense would often discredit its proponent. "What was done" cases
generally require that the defendant explain what actually occurred
and thereby show that, contrary to appearances and perhaps also the
testimony of a victim, there was no criminal conduct on his part.
Providing such an explanation is generally inconsistent with claiming
that the defendant was not involved at all in the transaction at issue in
the case. If he were completely uninvolved, he would not have had
occasion to learn the details of "what was done."
In a consent-defense rape case, for example, the defense could
theoretically argue both that someone else (not the defendant) had
sex with the victim and that the victim consented to sex with this
other person. The jury would be unlikely to believe, however, both
that the wrong person is being prosecuted and that the right person
had a justification for his behavior.41 Similarly, in a self-defense
assault or homicide case, in the absence of eyewitness testimony to
this effect, a jury might find implausible the claim that not only did
41. In one rape prosecution that involved elements of sado-masochism (S&M), for
example, a jury convicted a defendant who attempted to argue both that the victim
consented to what happened to her and that at least some of her injuries resulted from
another S&M relationship. The conviction was reversed on appeal on evidentiary
grounds. See People v. Jovanovic, 263 A.D.2d 182,192-97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
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the victim provoke the attack, but it was also not the defendant but
someone else whom the victim provoked and who then (justifiably)
attacked.42
The logical division of cases into "whodunit" and "what was
done," moreover, is not limited to crimes of violence. A person
prosecuted for criminal possession of heroin, for example, might
claim that he had no connection with the heroin seized by the
police-that they have the wrong man. He could, alternatively, claim
that the substance found on his person was baking soda rather than
heroin. It would be difficult, however, to claim both that the police
had the wrong man and that he, the wrong man, somehow knows that
the substance the police seized from the right man was actually
baking soda. Similarly, in a white-collar criminal case such as insider
trading, it is unlikely that a defendant would suggest that prosecutors
have the wrong person while simultaneously maintaining that the
right person traded without relying on any inside information.
Admittedly, there are cases in which the defendant has an
incentive to deny both identity and criminality. A murder case in
which no body is found might be such an instance. There the
defendant has an incentive to point out the glaring hole in the
prosecution's case even if he simultaneously maintains that he did not
do any harm to the victim. His primary defense is "whodunit" but,
without losing any credibility, he can point out the obvious-that
there might not have been a murder at all. Such cases must be
viewed, for purposes of my dichotomy, as "whodunit" cases that
would therefore preclude the admission of character evidence against
the defendant.
Normally, however, when a case is strong enough to go to trial, it
will take affirmative evidence from the defendant to make a plausible
claim that no crime occurred. Such an affirmative case will, in turn,
require that, to maintain credibility, the defendant must forego the
argument that the real criminal may be at large. For this reason of
credibility with the jury, notwithstanding the theoretical incentive to
challenge both identity and criminality, the "what was done"
defendant has in the past argued, and under my framework would
likely continue to argue, that what happened was not criminal, while
conceding that what happened did in fact involve him. On the basis
of such concessions, the judge can rule on the admissibility of
propensity evidence.
42. For one thing, it is unclear how the defendant would know that the victim either
consented to or provoked what happened if the defendant himself was not involved.
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III. THE EXCEPTIONS: EXPLANATION AND PRESCRIPTION
Federal law43 contains three main exceptions to the character
rule, several exceptions to the exceptions, and then some additional
exceptions that were added more recently. For each exception, the
"whodunit" versus "what was done" dichotomy provides a persuasive
account of existing departures from the usual ban on character
evidence. In some cases, the dichotomy counsels for a narrower or
broader exception, however. The dichotomy thus serves as an
instrument of both explanation (of current law) and prescription (for
legal reform).
The Defendant's Character
The first exception to the character rule is for "[c]haracter of
accused"' and allows for the admission of "[e]vidence of a pertinent
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same."'4 Thus, in a criminal case, the defendant may
introduce evidence of his own good character to show that he would
not, and therefore did not, commit the crime in question. Once he
does so, the prosecution may rebut with evidence of the defendant's
bad character.
Recall that in the "whodunit" context, because of the misleading
salience of the defendant at trial, I proposed retaining the exclusion
of bad character evidence about the defendant. In the case of good
character evidence about the defendant, however, we need not worry
about the defendant's salience in the courtroom distorting the
apparent relevance of such evidence. If the defendant is truly the sort
of person who would not commit the crime charged, then it follows
that he also did not commit the crime in question. The converse,
however, does not follow. Proof that the defendant would commit
such a crime does not make it especially likely that he did commit this
crime when there are many people who would commit such an
offense, only one of whom presumably committed this one. Thus, just
as negative character evidence would continue to be inadmissible
against the defendant in the "whodunit" scenario, positive character
evidence would continue to be admissible under my proposal, as it is
under current law.
A.

43. I focus on federal law for simplicity and because it often forms a model for state
rules. As noted supranote 8, many states have broadly similar bodies of evidence law.

44. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
45. Id.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

What about defendant character evidence in the "what was
done" scenario? Under existing law, no exception to the character
rule allows the prosecution to offer such evidence, unless the defense
first offers parallel evidence about the victim. 4 6 Recall the defendant
in the barroom fight who stands accused of having assaulted his
victim. Evidence that this defendant is a violent person is highly
probative and not misleading because both potential assailants, he
and his victim, are appropriately salient characters in the drama
unfolding in the courtroom. If either of them is shown to be violent,
the probabilities are shifted toward that one being the initial assailant.
For this reason, I have proposed that negative character evidence
about a defendant in the "what was done" scenario should be
admissible.
B.

The Victim's Character
The second exception to the character rules concerns the
"[c]haracter of alleged victim" and provides for the admission of:
[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a
character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the alleged victim was the first
aggressor.47
On its face, the second exception appears to admit evidence of a
victim's bad character across the board, but only to admit evidence of
a victim's good character in self-defense homicide cases.
Consider whether this distinction-between good victim and bad
victim character evidence-makes logical sense in the "what was
done" scenario. The significance of victim character evidence, in
terms of both probative value and prejudicial risk, parallels that of
defendant character evidence. In the "what was done" scenario, both
the defendant's and the victim's salience in the courtroom are
appropriate to their respective roles in the criminal drama. In the
case of self-defense assault, for example, one of two events occurred:
either the victim behaved in a violent manner giving rise to a
justification for the defendant's subsequent actions, or the defendant
behaved in an unjustifiably violent manner and is therefore guilty of
assault. Learning that the victim has a violent character increases the
46. Id at 404(a).
47. Id. at 404(a)(2).

2001]

ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

957

odds of the former scenario. Learning that the defendant is violent
increases the plausibility of the latter scenario. Learning that the
victim is peaceful would similarly increase the odds of the defendant's
guilt, just as learning of the defendant's peacefulness would tend to
In either case, no absent (and therefore
rule it out.
underappreciated) third party dilutes the value of character evidence
about the defendant or the victim. Thus, both defendant and victim
character evidence-for good or ill-ought to be admissible (and
equally so) in the "what was done" scenario.48
Now return to the actual rules. Under the rules, positive victim
propensity evidence is not admissible unless it is offered in a homicide
prosecution-one specific kind of "what was done" case-to rebut
the defendant's claim that the victim was the first aggressor.49 This
rule appears to reflect a general bias in criminal cases towards prodefendant evidence and against anti-defendant evidence. This bias is
sensible to a degree, because inappropriately prejudicial evidence has
a greater potential to cause injustice if directed against a criminal
defendant than if offered in his defense. Nonetheless, if evidence is
strong and appropriately persuasive, it does not enhance justice to bar
either the prosecution or the defense from offering it for the jury's
consideration.
In logical terms, in the case of a violent "what was done" crime,
peaceful victim evidence is at least as relevant as-if not more
relevant than-violentvictim evidence. Though a violent victim-one
who would assault another person-could still have been attacked
without provocation on the particular occasion, a peaceful victimone who would never attack another person without provocation-is,
by definition, incapable of the attack that the defendant claims
occurred. The admissibility of victim character evidence in "what was
done" cases should therefore not be limited to homicides. Apart
from the logical insupportability of excluding positive victim
character evidence in "what was done" cases as a general matter, it is
also difficult to understand the rationale behind dividing victim
homicides from victim character evidence in
character evidence in
50
other criminal trials.
48. In Part V's discussion of rape victim character evidence, we will see that the
proper analogy to the violent victim in a self-defense assault case is the dishonest-rather
than the promiscuous-victim in a rape case. See infra text accompanying notes 100-02.
49. FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
50. One possible explanation for the distinction might lie in the notion that it would
be cruel to eliminate the victim's presence entirely from a trial adjudicating her death, so
the bias against anti-defendant evidence is perhaps suspended in this limited case. The
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Let us now turn to victim character in the "whodunit" scenario.
Here, evidence of a victim's character is irrelevant to determining
whether or not the defendant is guilty. 1 Because Rule 404 admits
victim character evidence only if it is relevant, such "bad victim"
evidence is inadmissible 2 Consider why this is true. Recall that in
the "whodunit" scenario it is clear that someone has committed a
crime, but the government must prove that it was the defendant.
Consider now a case in which the victim is an elderly woman who is
gunned down in a drive-by shooting. Because the defense does not
argue that this drive-by shooting was somehow justifiable, the victim's
behavior prior to her death does not bear at all on the question of the
defendant's guilt. 3 Her character-and any light it might shed on her
behavior prior to the shooting-is therefore also immaterial.
The irrelevance of victim character in the "whodunit" scenario
extends to both positive and negative victim character evidence. The
victim's character does not bear on the guilt of the defendant accused
of killing her because, according to both the prosecution and the
defense, whoever killed her acted unjustifiably, regardless of how
good or bad a person she was. The jury is also likely to become
outraged about a crime committed against a good person, and this
outrage might unfairly settle upon the potentially innocent defendant.
The defendant's misleading courtroom salience in the "whodunit"
scenario is very dangerous here, because it places him in the perfect
position to be scapegoated.
For related reasons, courts have
sometimes excluded graphic pictures of a homicide victim to avoid
unnecessarily inflaming in the jury the desire to convict someone,
anyone, where the defendant-guilty or not-is the only available
candidate.54 In each of these cases, something outside of the
dying declaration hearsay exception may have a similar foundation. Cf Desmond
Manderson, Et Lex Perpetua: Dying Declarationsand Mozart's Requiem, 20 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1621, 1623 (1999) (characterizing the dying declaration exception as a "moral
necessity").
51. If the victim is a testifying witness, of course, then her character for sincerity is
relevant to determining whether her testimony is truthful. See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609. In
"whodunit" cases generally, however, the defense is less interested in attacking the
victim's sincerity (given the concession that he truly is a victim and that a crime really did
take place) than in raising doubts about the victim's capacity to perceive and to remember
accurately the identity of the perpetrator.
52. FED. R. EVID. 404 (a)(2) (admitting evidence of only a "pertinent trait of
character of the alleged victim" (emphasis added)).
53. Moreover, admitting evidence that the victim was a bad person creates a risk that
the jury might excuse a person who harms such a victim. The jury, in other words, might
see poetic justice in the defendant's causing harm to the victim, even though the
defendant's act was in no way legally defensible.
54. For a more detailed consideration of the admissibility of inflammatory
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defendant's control inspires a harshness in the jury that does not
logically correspond with the likelihood of defendant's guilt.
C. The Witness's Characterfor Truthfulness
The third exception to the propensity rule admits bad character
evidence about the insincerity of testifying witnesses in every case,
civil and criminal, and this exception receives detailed treatment in
Federal Rules 608 and 609. 5 As in my earlier discussion of Rules 404
and 405, I focus here on the preliminary admissibility question under
the "whodunit" versus "what was done" approach.
When a witness testifies, she does so under oath and thereby asks
the jury to believe that she has honestly communicated the truth to
the best of her knowledge. There are numerous ways to discredit
even an honest witness. The witness may, for example, have
misperceived or misremembered the event about which she is
testifying. But in addition to evaluating her ability to observe and
remember correctly, the jury needs to evaluate her sincerity. To do
so, it is useful to consider evidence of past insincerity.
As in the "what was done" criminal case, there is no risk that
learning about character traits will distract the jury from relevant but
absent third parties who share the same character traits. A witness's
inclination to lie makes it more likely that she is lying on this
particular occasion, just as a criminal defendant's past inclination to
photographs of victims in homicide trials, see, for example, State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d
1208,1214-17 (Ariz. 1983); Ritchie v. State, 632 P.2d 1244,1244-46 (Okla. 1981).
55. Rule 608(a) states:
the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may
refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
Rule 609(a) states:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a
witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted,
subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if
the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2) evidence that any witness
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). Rule 609(b) sets out time limits after which the evidence may
generally not be used. Rule 609(c) states the effect of an annulment or pardon. See FED.
R. EVID. 404(a)(3) (providing an exception to the character rule for veracity evidence
about a testifying witness).
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start fights makes it more likely that the defendant and not the victim
started this particular fight. The number of violent people in the
world outside the courtroom does not affect the defendant's
likelihood of having started the fight. Similarly, the large number of
insincere people outside the courtroom does not reduce the odds that
the testifying witness is lying. The veracity exception to the character
rule thus parallels the structure of the "what was done" criminal trial
scenario and would continue to exist under the approach outlined in
this Article.56

One aspect of Rule 609 that is noteworthy from the perspective
of studying criminal trials is the bias in favor of the criminal
defendant that we also saw in the rules governing defendant and
Under Rule 609(a)(2),
victim propensity evidence generally.
convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement are
always admissible against any testifying witness. For crimes not
specifically involving dishonesty or false statement, however, Rule
609(a)(1) provides that if a witness is a criminal defendant, the
probative value of felony convictions admissible on the impeachment
point must outweigh the danger of unfairly prejudicing the
defendant." When the witness is anyone other than the criminal
defendant, in contrast, Rule 609 allows the judge to admit all felony
convictions whose probative value is not substantially outweighed by
its tendency to cause unfair prejudice.58 As discussed earlier,
however, because such evidence is arguably highly prejudicial without
special protection for the defendant may
being especially probative,
59
here.
order
in
be
well
When a witness has a prior conviction for a felony that was not a
crime of dishonesty or false statement, the question whether to admit
such a conviction to prove a witness's dishonesty is a controversial
one, and Rule 609 represents a compromise between those who

56. Rule 608 does not allow for admission of evidence about a witness's good
character for veracity until it has been attacked. FED. R. EVID. 608. This differs from my
approach to defendant (and victim) character evidence, but it may be sensible in this
context to assume that jurors take for granted a witness's sincerity unless and until it has
been attacked. The jurors will, however, tend to question the character of the defendant
and the victim in "what was done" cases, because of the conduct in which they are each
alleged to have engaged. Offering positive sincerity evidence about a witness before any
attack might therefore waste the court's time.
57. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (stating that "evidence that an accused has been
convicted of [a felony] shall be admitted if the court determines that the probativevalue of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicialeffect to the accused" (emphasis added)).
58. Id.
59. See supra p. 951.
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would exclude it altogether and those who would uniformly admit it.'
The pro-admissibility argument asserts that anyone who is
disrespectful enough of the law to commit a felony would a fortiori be
willing to lie under oath.61 This argument holds that we simply cannot

trust the sincerity of felons. Those who favor exclusion of a criminal
defendant's prior convictions can point to the risk of jury retaliation
as well as to the risk that the defendant might be unfairly presumed

guilty on the basis of his criminal history, the same risks that account
for the Rule 404 exclusion of propensity evidence generally.6' It may
indeed be the hope of unfair prejudice that motivates the prosecution
to introduce such evidence.63

And the threat of its introduction

60. A divided Congress debated fiercely over the probative value of prior conviction
evidence before enacting Rule 609(a). Victor Gold, Impeachment By Conviction
Evidence: Judicial Discretion and the Politics of Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295,
2298 (1994). Presenting two sharply different versions of the same rule--one permitting
broad admissibility, the other narrow admissibility of prior conviction evidence-Congress
ultimately passed Rule 609. Id. at 2307-08. The passage of the Rule has been described as
follows:
The [Conference] Committee compromised by making crimes involving
dishonesty or false statement admissible with no discretion to exclude for unfair
prejudice, while also making admissible felony convictions for crimes not
involving dishonesty or false statement but only if probative value outweighed
unfair prejudice to the defendant. Apparently exhausted, both houses acceded
and enacted Rule 609(a).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
61. See H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character,and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar's Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 803-04 (1993) (stating that the "ancient
assumption from which the rule [permitting impeachment by prior felonies] was born" is
that "[flelons of all descriptions are forever afterward less truthful than other folk on any
subject"); James McMahon, Note, Prior Convictions Offered for Impeachment in Civil
Trials: The Interactionof FederalRules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
1063, 1065-66 (1986) (stating that the practice of allowing impeachment by prior felonies
"[r]ests on the arguably tenuous theory that prior criminal activity relates to veracity ...
[and that] a person who has committed a crime may have less of a general propensity for
truthfulness than a person with no prior criminal record").
This reasoning is implicit in the division of admissible convictions into two
categories: those that are admissible by virtue of their content (a crime of deception or
false statement, see FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2)), and those that are admissible by virtue of
their seriousness (a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for over a year, see FED.
R. EVID. 609(a)(1)).
62. See Alan D. Hornstein, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify
and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1997) ("The defendant
having previously sinned, a jury may well conclude either that the defendant is more likely
to have sinned on this occasion or that the defendant should be removed from society
regardless of her guilt of the instant offense."); Robert G. Spector, Impeaching the
Defendant by His Prior Convictions and the Proposed FederalRules of Evidence: A Half
Step Forwardand Three Steps Backward, 1 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 247, 248 (1970) (criticizing
this form of impeachment).
63. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 26, at 612 ("[C]onvictions are far
more often used to impeach witnesses in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases and seem
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pressures many defendants to choose between risking unfair
prejudice by testifying and foregoing the right to testify on their own
behalf.6'
IV.

THE RAPE DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER WITHIN THE
CATEGORIES

With the "whodunit" versus "what was done" typology in mind,
let us turn now to the most recently enacted character rule
Congress passed these rules in
exceptions, Rules 413-415.65
conjunction with the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), a
statute that, among other things, provided a federal cause of action
most often to be used to impeach the accused when he testifies in his own defense."); cf
Amina Quargnali-Linsley, Evidence Law-Boundaries, Balancing, and Prior Felony
Convictions: FederalRule of Evidence 403 After United States v. Old Chief, 28 N.M. L.
REV. 583, 601 (1998) (stating that in cases like Old Chief, the prosecutor's real motivation
for introducing prior conviction evidence may have been to prove the defendant's bad
character and not to create a persuasive narrative, as the prosecution claimed); Kathryn
Cameron Walton, Note, An Exercise in Sound Discretion: Old Chief v. United States, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1053, 1091-92 n.262 (1998) (stating that a prejudicial motive in Old Chief
was likely because prosecutors are aware of the fact that a juror will have fewer regrets
about convicting once they learn of a defendant's prior criminal record (citing Andrew K.
Dolan, Rule 403: The PrejudiceRule in Evidence, 49 S.CAL. L. REv. 220, 228 (describing
"the persistence of lawyers, especially prosecutors, in attempting to load the record with
inflammatory information they hope will move the jury"))).
64. See Hornstein, supra note 62, at 62 n.4 (stating that "if the defendant elects not to
testify, the probability of conviction ... increases dramatically"); see also Ohler v. United
States, 529 U.S. 753, 759-60 (2000) (holding that a testifying defendant who preemptively
introduces a prior conviction ruled admissible on a motion in limine waives the right to
challenge the in limine ruling on appeal); Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 43 (1984)
(holding that unless a defendant testifies, he waives the right to appeal a trial judge's
erroneous decision in limine to allow prior conviction impeachment of the defendant,
should he testify); Bryden & Park, supra note 28, at 536 (discussing how absurd the rules
are to admit prior nondeception crimes of a defendant to prove insincerity-to which they
are only marginally relevant, at best-but to instruct the jury not to consider the crimes as
they bear on the odds of guilt, a far more probative use of such evidence that the jury is
sure to consider, regardless of whether it is instructed to do so). Bryden and Park argue
persuasively as well that the pressure on a defendant to say "I am innocent" is so great
that he will lie if he is guilty, even if he is generally honest, and he will tell the truth if he is
innocent, even if he is generally dishonest. See id. at 536. His honesty or dishonesty is
thus of no real utility in determining whether his testimony is truthful:
If the accused is innocent of the crime at bar, then prior conviction impeachment
defeats justice because it makes his denial appear false when it is not. If the
accused is guilty, then prior conviction impeachment still does not illuminate his
truthfulness unless one assumes that a guilty person with a clean record would be
less likely to lie to obtain an acquittal. In view of the guilty defendant's strong
incentive to lie on the stand, it is doubtful that those with clean records are much
more credible than those with prior convictions.
ld. at 536-37.
65. FED. R. EVID. 413-415.
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for victims of gender-motivated violence.'

As part of a political

compromise surrounding the passage of VAWA, Congress enacted
three new exceptions to the character rule, allowing for antidefendant evidence in cases of rape and child molestation.
Commentators almost uniformly criticized these rules as an
indefensible product of political logrolling. 67
To some extent, the rules deserve to be criticized.

The

introduction of negative character evidence about the defendant will
not advance the search for truth in every rape and child molestation
trial. Most rape trials, for example, are of "stranger rapes."' When a
66. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The United States Supreme Court has invalidated part
of the statute on the ground that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in passing
the legislation. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (invalidating the
civil remedy portion of VAWA).
67. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 26, at 495 ("FRE 413-415 came as
part of a politically charged crime bill, apparently added at the last minute in a Conference
Committee in order to win votes in the House that were crucial to passage."). Various
groups strongly opposed Rules 413-415, among them the Advisory Committee of the
Federal Judicial Conference, the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference, and the
American Bar Association House of Delegates. See id. at 495-96; see also Ellis, supra note
21, at 975 (arguing that in enacting Rules 413-415, "Congress was more interested in
appeasing the political cries of the public, rather than providing reasonable legislation");
Anne Elsbury Kyl, Note, The Propriety of Propensity: The Effect and Operationof New
FederalRules of Evidence 413 and 414, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 659, 659 (1995) (characterizing
Rules 413-415 as the result of "extensive negotiations between Reps. [Susan] Molinari [of
New York] and [Jon] Kyl [of Arizona] and the House Democratic leadership"); cf. Aluise,
supra note 11, at 159 (discussing how Congress established an unusual mechanism for the
accelerated passage of these rules and stating that "Rules 413-415 can be viewed as a
political response to a troubling problem that received widespread attention from the
popular press").
68. See Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 FLA. L. REV.
487, 489 n.10 (1991); see also Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1214 (noting that
"[r]eported and prosecuted rape cases are disproportionately stranger rapes"). By
"stranger rapes," I mean rapes in which the victim is not acquainted with the perpetrator,
either socially, through work, or otherwise. Compare this with data that in 1999, only
three out of ten rapes were committed by strangers. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Characteristics of Crime, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/cvictLc.htm (last
visited Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Bryden and
Lengnick note:
Some authors argue that attrition statistics, which do not distinguish between
stranger and acquaintance rape, mask official bias against victims of
acquaintance rape. When separate tabulations are made for different types of
rape, the picture changes, often dramatically. A study of Travis County, Texas,
found that the probability of indictment was much higher in stranger rape cases
(58%) than in acquaintance rape cases (29%). A study of felony filings in
Hawaii reached similar conclusions.
Of cases dismissed, 50% involved
acquaintances, 38% persons who had just met, and only 12% strangers. Of those
cases in which felonies were filed, only 28% involved acquaintances, 20%
persons who had just met, and 49% strangers.
Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1214 (footnotes omitted).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

defendant stands trial for a typical stranger rape, he effectively
concedes that someone committed a rape against the victim, but
disputes that he was the one who did it. In other words, stranger rape
prosecutions are typically of the "whodunit" variety. Given this fact,
evidence that the defendant committed rape in the past would
generate the cognitive distortions in the courtroom setting that make
negative character evidence about "whodunit" criminal defendants
unfairly prejudicial and only minimally probative. 9 The same could
be said for at least some child molestation cases, in which the
molester's identity is in question. Thus, for the "whodunit" cases, the
new federal rules open the door to inappropriate defendant
propensity evidence.7"
Consider now the "what was done" category of acquaintance
rape and child molestation cases. In these cases, evidence of the
defendant's propensity for rape or for child molestation is highly
relevant. In an acquaintance rape trial, for example, we know that
either the accuser or the defendant has done something
reprehensible. One possibility is that the accuser has lodged a false
complaint of rape against the defendant and is pursuing an unjust
conviction of an innocent person. The alternative is that the
defendant has raped the accuser-a cruel and abhorrent act of
violation with devastating consequences for the victim.7 ' Evidence
that the defendant has demonstrated a propensity for sexual assault in
the past makes it far more likely that the bad actor in the courtroom
drama is the defendant as opposed to his accuser.72
When a child accuses an acquaintance of molesting him, we must
consider the unfortunate reality that children can be unusually
69. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
70. Professor Roger Park has also criticized Rules 413-415 when applied to stranger
rape cases. Park, supra note 37, at 271-72 n.3. He argues that "[a]Uowing free proof of
propensity to rape in stranger rape cases would create a startling anomaly in the law of
evidence," and that "[n]othing in common sense or systematic study justifies [the]
distinction" between stranger rapes and stranger robberies, murders, or other crimes. Id.
71. See Donald Dripps et al., Men, Women and Rape, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV. 125, 158
(1994) (noting that victims of acquaintance rape often indicate a psychological harm
stemming from a feeling of betrayal, "because the victim has been attacked by someone in
whom she has placed her trust and confidence"); Kathleen F. Cairney, Note, Addressing
Acquaintance Rape: The New Direction of the Rape Law Reform Movement, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 291, 308 n.90 (1995) ("[A]cquaintance rape may cause victims worse
psychological damage because they are harmed by persons they trust." (citing Nancy E.
Roman, Scales of Justice Weigh Tiers of Sexual Assault; State May Reform Rape Law,
WASH. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A8 (reporting based on an interview with Kathryn
Kolbert, Vice President of the Center of Reproductive Law and Strategy))).
72. For a discussion of the implications of this categorical approach for rape victim
propensity evidence, see infra Part V.
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susceptible to the power of suggestion and may also confuse fantasy
with reality.73 These phenomena-when brought to the attention of a
jury--can stand as an obstacle to conviction. In such cases, either the
child is under adult influence (or is lying) or the defendant is guilty of
an extremely serious offense. Learning that the defendant has a
propensity for acts of child molestation greatly increases the
plausibility of the latter alternative. In this class of cases, as in the
consent-defense rape context, the new rules of evidence therefore
make a good deal of sense.
Rules 413-415 are, in other words, over-inclusive for covering
"whodunit" sexual offenses, and they are under-inclusive for failing to
cover non-rape and non-molestation trials of the "what was done"
variety.
I have argued that consent-defense rape cases are a species of the
"what was done" scenario and should be treated as such. A different
view, one advanced by Professor Roger Park, is that harmful
defendant propensity evidence should be uniquely admissible in
consent-defense rape cases. He makes two arguments in support of
this claim. First, Park suggests that, in criminal cases other than
consent-defense rape, the admissibility of defendant propensity
evidence could deter the police from undertaking an adequate
investigation of physical evidence.74 Second, he proposes that
harmful defendant propensity evidence is uniquely probative in
consent-defense rape cases. 75 Let us examine each argument in turn.
In an article co-authored with Professor David Bryden, Park
voices the concern that, in the run of cases, a rule admitting a
defendant's criminal record would diminish police motivation to do a
thorough investigation, because the prosecutor could simply rely on
propensity evidence to convict the defendant. In consent-defense
rape cases, this worry is absent because, "[a]side from the testimony
of the alleged victim, the uncharged misconduct [i.e., prior rapes] is
73. See Leslie Feiner, The Whole Truth: Restoring Reality to Children'sNarrative in
Long-Term Incest Cases, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1385, 1386 (1997) (noting that
some psychoanalytic experts argue that children can state their fantasies as if they were
true allegations). In addition to projecting fantasy as reality, there are also developmental
issues related to children's memory retrieval that may make a child's recollection appear
to be incorrect. See Julie A. Dale, Comment, Ensuring Reliable Testimony From Child
Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Cases: Applying Social Science Evidence to a New Fact-Finding
Method, 57 ALB. L. REv. 187, 192-93 (1993) (discussing how a child's level of
developmental maturity can affect the ability to retrieve and repeat accurate information
from memory, even though the child's memories may themselves be accurate).
74. Park, supranote 37, at 273.
75. Id.at 272.
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For this reason, the

authors urge the admission of such evidence in consent-defense rape
trials.
The worry that admitting propensity evidence in criminal trials,
other than those for consent-defense rape, will reduce the incentive
for police to do adequate investigation does not seem well-founded.
The police often, for instance, will not have any particular suspect in
mind at the very beginning of an investigation. In the case of a
stranger rape, for example, the police would be likely to encourage
the victim to get a physical examination during which physical
evidence called a "rape kit" would be collected."

Assembling

samples of DNA and fingerprints can help to facilitate the process of
identifying and capturing a suspect.
As the United States Supreme Court has observed, police zeal in
the "often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime" 78 is likely to

drive police to gather much more evidence than is necessary once a
suspect is in hand rather than to stop prematurely at less evidence
than is necessary. 79 The accused similarly has every reason to try to
build a defensive case based on physical evidence and to point out
police sloppiness and omissions to the jury.80 Park and Bryden are
therefore mistaken in thinking that consent-defense cases, on the one
hand, and stranger rape along with all remaining criminal cases, on
the other, provide distinct evidence-gathering incentives. The
admissibility of propensity evidence in consent-defense rape cases
76. Bryden & Park, supra note 28, at 579.
77. See e.g., United States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 538 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A 'rape kit'
is the name of the product frequently employed for the examination of a sexual assault
victim in which pubic hair, blood samples, swabs, and specimens from various parts of the
victim's body and clothing are collected and retained for further forensic examination and
evaluation.").
78. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (recognizing that police have a
particular interest in criminal justice and espousing the need for a "neutral and detached
magistrate" to make the decision whether or not to issue a warrant).
79. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966). In Miranda, Chief Justice
Warren stated:
Although confessions may play an important role in some convictions, the cases
before us present graphic examples of the overstatement of the 'need' for
confessions. In each case authorities conducted interrogations ranging up to five
days in duration despite the presence, through standardinvestigating practices,of
considerableevidence against each defendant.
Id- (emphasis added).
80. In the O.J. Simpson case, for example, defense attorney Johnny Cochran argued
that the Los Angeles Police Department was corrupt and cited several examples of poor
police investigation in gathering the evidence relied on by the prosecution. See JEFFREY
TOOBIN, THE RUN OF HIS LIFE: THE PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON 255-56,281 (1996).
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should turn only on its high probative value and corresponding
reduced danger of undue prejudice, not on any special departure
from concerns about police disincentives to investigate.81
In addition to making the incentive argument, Park has
elsewhere argued that propensity evidence is uniquely probative in
consent-defense rape cases.2 Unlike my theory of "what was done"
cases, the Park approach to this evidence turns on the presence of
what he calls "a credibility contest '83 or a "he says/she says" situation
in the consent-defense rape scenario. 84
Park makes a flawed assumption in distinguishing consentdefense rape cases from all other criminal cases. Though consentdefense rape cases may often involve a credibility contest, they do not
invariably do so. As Park acknowledges in the article co-authored
with Bryden, "[i]n some cases the complaining witness's version of
events is partially corroborated by physical evidence such as
bruises."85 In addition or alternatively, bystanders might have seen or
heard something material to the case. Importantly, even when a
particular consent-defense rape case does not boil down to a
credibility contest alone, harmful propensity evidence about the
defendant remains highly probative. The defendant's rape history
supports the plausibility of the complainant's claim that the defendant
raped her and thus reduces the plausibility of his claim that her
accusation is false. For that reason, rather than because of some
unique "he said/she said" controversy, the defendant's rape history
ought to be admissible.
Under my two-category approach, propensity evidence is highly
relevant and not unduly prejudicial whenever the risk of mistaken
identity has been eliminated from the equation, i.e., in the "what was
done" scenario. What makes propensity evidence against the
defendant questionable and unfairly prejudicial in "whodunit" cases
81. There may be some cases in which there is so much pressure to "get" someone
that police settle on a suspect and do as little further investigation as possible. For such
cases, character evidence might be the difference between police looking for more
evidence and suspects, and their resting on their laurels. There is no reason to expect,
however, that this would happen generally in all criminal cases that are not consentdefense rapes.
82. On the probative value question, Roger Park suggests that "consent-defense cases
are different enough from other criminal cases to justify admitting evidence of propensity
to rape." Park, supranote 37, at 277.
83. IL at 273.
84. Park explains that although drug sting operations might theoretically also present
such a "swearing contest" scenario, this could be avoided by better police planning ahead
of time. Id. at 273-74.
85. Bryden & Park, supra note 28, at 578.
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is the misleading salience of the defendant in the courtroom as
compared with all other people who share his propensity for
wrongdoing. In the "whodunit" case, the jury is likely to undervalue
the probability that one of the many other people with a criminal
predisposition might have committed this offense. Park and his coauthors do not discuss or take into account this crucial undue
prejudice problem shared by all (and only) the "whodunit" cases.
The "what was done" scenario does not give rise to this problem,
because there is a consensus between the parties about the identity of
the involved actors and thus no absent group of suspects for the jury
to overlook. Such a consensus has the same logical consequences in
an assault or murder case in which the defendant claims self-defense
or defense of others, as it does in a consent-defense rape case.
Consider the homicide case in which the defendant claims that
she was actually trying (unsuccessfully) to stop the victim from killing
himself. An eyewitness might testify that he saw the defendant shove
the victim into the path of an oncoming train. The defendant might
then point out that the eyewitness does not see well and therefore
mistook for a shove her unsuccessful attempt to prevent the victim
from jumping off the platform. Such a case would fall into the "what
was done" class of scenarios because the disagreement is not about
who was involved but about what transpired between the involved
actors. As such, it would be helpful to learn that the defendant has
killed or tried to kill other people before just as it would be helpful in
the other direction to learn that the victim had previously attempted
suicide.
In the above example, there is no swearing contest. No one
suggests that the witness is lying, only that the witness misperceived
what occurred. What matters, then, is not whether there is a swearing
contest but whether there is a misleading salience that inflates the
apparent relevance of character evidence. Notably, there is none
here, because neither party disputes that the defendant was involved
in the transaction in question. The only question is what the victim
and the defendant were doing. In short, the principles that make
harmful defendant propensity evidence highly relevant in consentdefense rape cases apply to all "what was done" scenarios, and the
swearing contest that characterizes some but not all consent-defense
rape cases proves to be neither necessary nor sufficient to the
application of these principles.
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V. A DEFENSE OF THE RAPE SHIELD LAW: RAPE VICTIMS'
CHARACTER IN "WHAT WAS DONE" CASES

Comparing the consent-defense rape case with other "what was
done" scenarios such as self-defense assault might seem to imply that
there is nothing special about propensity evidence in rape trials.
Given this potential implication, I must explore what my theory has
to say about the fact that rape victim propensity evidence falls under
a special evidentiary rule of exclusion-the rape shield law.
Rape shield laws prohibit the introduction of victim sexual
propensity evidence in rape trials.8 6 Defenders of rape shield laws
contend that the admissibility of victim sexual character evidence
deters rape victims from reporting the crime and that the
recommended propensity inference both reflects and reinforces a
reductionist division of women into "good girls"-those who do not
engage in sexual relations outside of marriage-and "bad girls"those who do (and who consequently "assume the risk" of being
raped), s7 Though the various versions differ in their particulars, all
states have enacted their own rape shield laws."8
86. Rule 412, the federal rape shield law, provides that, with some exceptions, "[t]he
following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct... : (1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition." FED. R. EVID. 412; see United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1196-97
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1128 (2000).
87. See Elizabeth J. Kramer, Note, When Men are Victims: Applying Rape Shield
Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 293, 303-10 (1998) (stating that rape
shield laws were enacted in the 1970s to help increase the number of rapes women
reported, to recognize the "lack of probative value" in admitting prior consensual acts
during trials, as well as the "lack of connection between chastity and truthfulness," and to
reduce acquittals which occur because of the introduction of a victim's sexual history); cf
Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1355 (noting that in both England and the United
States, rape prosecutions in which the victim was a virgin were successful ninety-four
percent of the time, whereas in those cases in which a victim's "sexual reputation was
markedly discredited during the trial," the success rate was only forty-eight percent).
Because rape cases are most often litigated in state court, the federal rape shield
law has served more as a prototype for state legislation than as applicable law in federal
court. In some cases, however, federal courts do have jurisdiction over what are
essentially state crimes (including rapes) when they occur in federal enclaves such as
Indian reservations. See e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 333 (1978) (allowing
the federal prosecution of the defendant for a statutory rape that occurred on an Indian
reservation).
88. The federal rape shield law, Rule 412, was adopted in 1978 and then amended in
1994. As of this writing, every one of the States has a version of the rape shield law. See
Bopst, supra note 17, at 131-32 n.32 (1998) (listing the forty-nine state rape-shield statutes
and the federal rape shield law in existence at that time). The last state to pass a rape
shield law, Arizona, did so in 1998. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1421 (West 1998 & Supp.
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Rule 412 contains three exceptions. First, evidence that a third
party might have been the source of semen or injury is admissible. s9
Second, evidence of prior sexual relations between the victim and the
accused is admissible to prove consent.' Third, any evidence whose
admissibility is guaranteed to the defendant by the United States
Constitution is admissible.91
In evaluating the rape shield law, let us first consider the overall
relevance of evidence regarding a rape complainant's "propensity to
consent to sexual relations." Such predisposition evidence appears
structurally to resemble evidence admitted in the "what was done"
scenario discussed above. As in a self-defense assault case, we know
who the relevant actors are, and the only open question is exactly
what occurred between them. The evidentiary argument generally
barred by the rape shield law is this: the victim has been consensually
sexually active with other men in the past, and therefore it is more
likely (than it would be in the absence of this sexual propensity
evidence) that she also consented to sexual intercourse with this
defendant.
Feminists have long battled this inference, arguing that there is
no general "character for consenting" that would help us predict
whether a victim in a rape trial was likely to have consented to
intercourse with her alleged rapist. 91 The notion that women can be
divided into "madonnas" and "whores" based upon their sexual
choices is repugnant and seems to go hand in hand with a "no means
yes" philosophy and other efforts to deny women sexual agency.93
2000).
States vary in what they exclude under their respective rape shield laws. See
generally Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A
Proposalfor the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 906-07 (1986) (providing a table
listing the rape shield laws of forty-eight states and sorting them by their attributes).
89. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(A).
90. Id- at 412(b)(1)(B).
91. Id. at 412(b)(1)(C). Though my focus here is on criminal cases, Rule 412 provides
some protection against the admission of sexual propensity evidence in civil cases as well.
In civil cases, Rule 412 provides that evidence of a victim's sexual history is admissible
only if its probative value substantially outweighs its tendency to harm any victim or cause
unfair prejudice to any party. Id. at 412(b)(2).
92. See, e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE

STATE 175 (1989) (describing and objecting to the division of women into "spheres of
consent").
93. See Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A
Look at the Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REv. 795, 809 (1996). Ross discusses the myth that
"if a woman has previously consented to have extramarital sex, she is promiscuous and
probably will consent to have sex with any man who asks." Id. She further notes that this
myth that women are either "madonnas or whores" contributes to the poor conviction
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Some commentators, however, have held firm in the view that sexual

predisposition evidence is relevant and would contribute, at least in
the acquaintance rape context, to a determination of what actually

happened on the night in question. 94 These commentators might
consider the victim's sexual character in a rape case to be just as
probative on the question of victim consent as an aggravated assault
victim's violent character would be on the question of self-defense.
The similar structure of these two "what was done" inquiries into
character appears to support the analogy between rape and other
crimes.
A.

Victim Propensity: Rape vs. Other Crimes

No one has yet adequately defended the distinction between a
victim's violent character in a self-defense assault (or homicide)
case-fair game for the defense-and a victim's sexual predisposition
or character in a consent-defense rape case-off-limits to the defense.
Perhaps for this reason, one might think that there is no logical
distinction. If we study the two kinds of cases closely, however, an
important difference emerges that logically, rather than politically,
justifies the rape shield exception to the usual admissibility of victim
character evidence. This difference, moreover, does not diminish the
relevance and utility of negative defendant propensity evidence in
both types of "what was done" scenarios. Finally, in prosecutions for
both consent-defense rape and self-defense assault, there is a place
levels of acquaintance rapes. See id. at 809 n.47 (citation omitted); see also Donna L.
Laddy, McGregor Electronic Industries: A Per Se Rule Against Admitting Evidence of
General Sexual Expression as a Defense to Sexual Harassment Claims, 78 IOWA L. REV.
939, 958 n.134 (1993) ("Often courts fit women into one of two categories-good girl or
bad girl-without taking into account the complexity of differences in women." (citations
omitted)).
94. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 26, at 492-95. Commenting on the
Rule 412 restrictions on the admission of a victim's sexual history, Mueller and
Kirkpatrick write:
That such evidence often has little or no bearing on the question whether a
person consented to engage in sex on a particular occasion seems ... to be true.
But it is not clear that such evidence is never relevant in sexual assault cases, and
the operation of rape shield rules and statutes presents some difficulties.
IL at 492-93. As a situation in which "circumstances lend at least some credibility to
defense claims of consent and in which the woman was a 'victim' only if she is speaking the
truth and defendant is lying," the authors ask us to "[c]onsider now, not the case in which
a woman is suddenly assaulted on the street or in her home by a person she has never seen
before," but an acquaintance rape claim. Id. at 493; see also Charles C. Crawford & Marc
A. Johnston, An Evolutionary Model of Courtship and Mating as Social Exchange:
Implicationsfor Rape Law Reform, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 181, 199-200 (1999) (explaining
that in acquaintance rape cases in which the evidence favoring conviction is not
overwhelming, judges and jurors tend to view the victim's sexual history as relevant).
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for the introduction of harmful victim propensity evidence, albeit of a
different sort than the sexual propensity evidence barred by the rape
shield law.
When a defendant claims self-defense in a prosecution for
aggravated assault, he asserts that his victim behaved in a manner that
momentarily released the defendant from the usual rule prohibiting
aggravated assault. In some sense, the victim can be said by her
behavior to have temporarily forfeited the legal right not to be
physically harmed. It follows that, in such trials, either the defendant
or the victim behaved in an unjustifiably violent manner, the relative
likelihood of which can be illuminated by reference to their respective
histories of unjustified violence."
Compare the assault prosecution with the consent-defense rape
trial. When an accused rapist asserts that the victim consented to
sexual intercourse, it is not the case that either the defendant behaved
unjustifiably by committing a rape or the victim behaved unjustifiably
by consenting to sexual intercourse. In other words, there is not the
symmetrical potential for violent behavior on either side that we saw
in the non-sexual assault context. If there was no rape, then no one
acted wrongfully on the night in question. The victim's sexual
character, then, unlike the assault victim's violent character, fails to
give the jury a likely true perpetrator to substitute for the accused.
As we will see, this asymmetry has implications for the relative utility
of different kinds of victim character evidence in "what was done"
cases.
This point alone, however, does not necessarily dispose of the
probative value of sexual predisposition evidence, even if we reject
the notion that sexually active women are "whores" who somehow
waive their entitlement to refuse consent to sexual relations. 96 After
all, most behavior can be classified along a continuum, and knowing
95. Of course, there could be the occasional case in which an assault victim harmed
the assailant in the reasonable but mistaken belief that the assailant was about to attack
the victim. In such a case, the assailant might subsequently have attacked the victim in the
correct belief that the attack was necessary to avoid being harmed. If this were to happen,
neither the assailant nor the victim would have behaved badly. Even in such a case,
however, each party would likely contend that the other's actions were unreasonable and
unjustifiable, and thus, character for violence would not-at the fact-finding stage-be
eliminated from the equation.
96. Note that a prostitute does not, by virtue of her profession, waive the right to
refuse consent on any particular occasion, from either a legal or a moral standpoint. See 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *212-13 (distinguishing between Roman law
and English law in this regard); Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibilityfor Violations of
Women's Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 153 n.154 (1994) ("[R]ape should not
be considered less serious when the victims are prostitutes.").
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where an individual falls along that continuum generally helps us
predict what that individual will do on a particular occasion. If X
(female) and Y (male) went out on a date, for example, and we
wished to place bets on whether X decided to have sex with Y on this
date, the knowledge that X regularly decides to have sex with each
new man whom she dates would help us calculate the odds, even if we
passed no normative judgments upon either X or Y.11
B.

The ConditionalIrrelevance of Victim Sexual Propensity

If sexual predisposition is a meaningful construct, then why not
admit it against the victim in consent-defense rape cases? The answer
is that once there is a rape prosecution, we have a piece of
information whose significance overwhelms any relevance that the
sexual propensity data would have-the victim swears that, on the
occasion in question, she did not consent. Consider what this means.
A person who is in a physical confrontation with another has a builtin incentive-wanting to seem like a peaceful person-to say that the
other person started the fight, regardless of whether it is true. That is
the status of our defendant and victim in the self-defense assault case.
Each one wants to characterize the fight as the other person's fault.
The woman who consents to sexual intercourse, however, has no
systematic incentive to claim that what occurred was actually a rape.
Indeed, she is subject to a stigma if she openly makes a rape
accusation. 98
97. Similarly, in calculating whether a child ate a slice of pizza left in the refrigerator
(without actually looking in the refrigerator), it is useful to know that the child loves pizza
and tends to consume it regularly when it is around.
98. See Sherry F. Colb, Assuming Facts Not in Evidence, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 745, 755
(1994) ("[R]ape victims ... are reluctant to talk to friends and family. We know from
psychologists that the reasons for this, though varied, stem in part from the stigma
attaching to victims that makes rape a virtually unique crime."); Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 813 (1991) ("[F]ar from protecting women, rape
prosecutions served to stigmatize all but a few as liars and whores, as vindictive and
spiteful, as villains rather than victims."); see also Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket:
Rape Trauma Syndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1271, 1333
(1994) (explaining how expert testimony can "explain a woman's [initial] failure to report
rape, not as a symptom, but in terms of the likelihood of disbelief by police, retaliation by
the rapist, hostility of family and support network, and the stress caused by the judicial
proceedings and stigma of being a public rape 'victim' ").
Of course, a person who has consensual sex-such as an adulterous wife who has a
jealous and violent husband-might have an incentive to portray the event as a rape. If a
victim-witness has such a motive, then the defense can offer evidence of it in the particular
case. See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232-33 (1988) (holding that a state court
decision to exclude the victim's live-in relationship with her boyfriend violated the
Confrontation Clause when the defense theory explained the rape charge as concocted to
preserve the victim's relationship with her boyfriend). It does not follow, however, that

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Several things follow from the distinction between victim
propensity evidence in rape and assault cases. First, we would expect
that each of two participants in a violent altercation would claim that
the other one started the fight and thereby provoked justifiable
defensive action.9 9 Second, and as a result, we would probably not

separately judge the initiator of the fight much more harshly for
falsely accusing his victim than we would for the assault itself. The
primary bad act in an assault, in other words, is the unjustified
violence-whether by the defendant or by the putative victim-not
the self-interested and predictable false claim by one of the two that
his own violence was undertaken in justifiable self-defense.
In the consent-defense rape case, by contrast, we would not
expect a person-regardless of whether she is sexually active-to
claim falsely that a consensual sexual act in which she participated
was actually a rape. Unlike a participant in a fight, for example, who
runs the risk of prosecution for assault if he does not claim assault,
she does run a risk of being prosecuted for consenting to sexual
relations if she does not claim rape. To make a rape accusation
falsely thus represents an act of significant treachery and dishonesty.
The false rape accuser is accordingly a bad (and deviant) actor not for
having had consensual sex in the first place, but for having later made
a false accusation about it.100
In the "whodunit" scenario, recall that the defendant's innocence
is entirely consistent with the victim-witness having done nothing
reprehensible or deviant. An eyewitness's honest identification error
could explain the prosecution of the wrong person. Recall that the
victim's character is also completely irrelevant in the "whodunit"
case, because both parties concede that a crime took place.
Introducing character evidence about either the defendant or the
victim therefore risks confusing the jury with little or no fair payoff in
the "whodunit" case. Contrast the two "what was done" cases we
have been examining, consent-defense rape and self-defense assault.
In each case, one of two people-the defendant or the complainant-

having consensual sex, in and of itself, gives rise to an incentive for women to characterize
the sex as forced; indeed, the opposite is true. This distinguishes the status of rape victim
from the status of assault victim, in which a combatant has a built-in motive to say that the
other person was the assailant and he the innocent victim.
99. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1324 (stating that in self-defense assault
cases, there is a race to the courthouse and whoever gets there first is the "victim").
100. Perhaps this was less true at a time when it was generally considered shameful to
have consensual sex outside of marriage-although even then, that fact would be
irrelevant where the rape accusation itself is what brought the intercourse to light.
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has done something very wrong. Because we must select a villain,
each individual's character becomes highly relevant.
Unlike the self-defense assault case, however, where the relevant
victim character trait would be manifest during the alleged attack, the
relevant victim-character dimensions in the consent-defense rape case
are the dishonesty and vindictiveness manifested at the time of the
later accusation and not a propensity to consent to sexual activity
manifest at the time of the alleged offense. To put it differently, it is
no more likely that a sexually active woman would carry out such a
scurrilous act of false rape accusation than that a woman less sexually
experienced would do so. The informative value of an inclination to
consent to sexual activity thus vanishes once a woman has leveled an
accusation of rape against a man.
Consider the following analogy. John works for a corporation
that runs semi-annual blood drives in its cafeteria. In the past, John
has donated blood on a regular basis. In the first blood drive of 2001,
however, John feels somewhat queasy and decides not to donate this
time. He walks through the cafeteria, thinking that he might like a
glass of the orange juice the Red Cross typically provides at blood
drives.
As he approaches the blood booth, John feels a tap on his
shoulder. Turning around, he notices the blood technician George
and says, "Hello." The technician asks whether John will be donating
this year, and John responds that he will not. George then grabs John
and straps him to a gurney. He proceeds to pierce John's vein with a
needle and then hook up the needle to a standard one-pint blood
collection bag. Throughout this procedure, John struggles and
repeatedly implores George not to do this.
Assume now that the state brings criminal charges for aggravated
assault against George. The situation represents a "what was done"
scenario. There is no question about whether George took blood
from John. The only controverted issue is whether or not the taking
of this blood was consensual. The defense claims that John agreed to
permit George to take his blood. The prosecution claims that George
forced John to give blood while John refused consent and pleaded
with George to stop.
One of the two men has done something terribly wrong. Either
George has committed a deplorable assault on John, or John has
directed a slanderous criminal accusation against George. There is
not, however, the kind of symmetry of harms present in the selfdefense assault case: if John consented to the taking of his blood, it is
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his later false accusation (and not his original consent to give blood)
that is reprehensible and deviant.
To determine which of the two competing factual accounts here
is accurate, we might wish to know something about what each of the
men is capable of doing. In the case of George, learning that he has
violently assaulted people in the past would be informative. Even
more informative would be learning that he has previously forced
unwilling persons to donate blood. With respect to John, the victim
of George's alleged assault, it would be useful to know whether John
has ever made false criminal accusations against anyone in the past
and whether John is generally dishonest.
That John has in previous years donated blood consensually
would not constitute probative defense evidence. Consider why this
is so. If we were trying to determine whether a random person at
John's corporation, Jane, consensually donated blood at this year's
drive, knowing nothing else, we would surely consider her past
practice of donating blood relevant to our inquiry. The difference
between Jane and John, however, is in the salient fact that only John
claims to have been forced to donate blood on this occasion. The fact
of John's claim overwhelms any relevance of John's past donation
practices.
In describing this phenomenon, we might say that John's past
donation practices are conditionallyirrelevant,the condition being the
fact of his accusation regarding this occasion. The plausibility of his
claim that he was forced to donate on this occasion does not turn on
his propensity for donating blood in the past. A frequent donor is, in
other words, no more likely to make a false accusation of forcible
donation than a less frequent donor. The plausibility of the
accusation rests instead on John's credibility, on the one hand, and on
George's propensity for violence or forcible blood taking, on the
other.
Conditional irrelevance as a concept takes as its point of
departure the principle of conditional relevance. As set out in Rule
104, some evidence is relevant only if certain factual preconditions
are first satisfied. 10 1 If the government wants to offer a weapon into
evidence as the murder weapon, for example, it first must
demonstrate (such that a reasonable juror could conclude) that the

101. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) ("When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the

condition.").
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weapon truly was the murder weapon. If there is insufficient
evidence that the gun was the murder weapon, then the gun is not
relevant to the case. It might actually be more accurate to say that
the relevance of the gun to the case is conditioned on there being
some possibility that it was the murder weapon, even if the possibility
is too small to justify admitting the gun into evidence.1 2
To understand the interdependence of evidence in supporting
relevance judgments, take the case in which a man stands trial for the
murder of his wife. Assume that the prosecution offers evidence that
the defendant was a wife-abuser. In attempting to bar the evidence,
the defense might claim that of all men who abuse their wives, only a
tiny fraction actually kill them.10 3 With these odds, it would seem that
the defendant's battering is not highly probative evidence, even if the
odds of a non-abusive husband killing his wife are even slimmer.
Add, however, the fact that the victim in the particular case was
murdered, and the abuse evidence takes on a greater significance. 1°4
Of women who were murdered and whose husbands were wifeabusers, the actual odds that the husband killed the victim are nine to
one. 5 Knowing that the victim was murdered increases dramatically
the relevance of the husband's abuse history in determining whether
or not he killed her. The abuse history would be far less relevant, for
example, if we did not know whether she was dead. If we were trying
to predict whether a battering husband whose wife is now alive would
102. See Ronald J. Allen, The Myth of ConditionalRelevancy, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
871, 873 (1992) ("In fact, neither [of two facts] is conditionally relevant upon the other,
unless the probability of one of them is 0.0."). In this piece, Allen elaborates the case,
presented over a decade earlier, for dismantling the doctrine of conditional relevancy. See
id.; see also Vaughn C. Ball, The Myth of ConditionalRelevancy, 14 GA. L REV. 435, 469
(1980); Dale Nance, ConditionalRelevance Reinterpreted,70 B.U. L. Rev. 447, 448 (1990).
I do not take a position in this Article on the advisability of retaining the conditional
relevance doctrine. Nonetheless, I do accept and support one relatively uncontroversial
premise of the doctrine-the idea that the probative value of one piece of evidence can
vary depending on what other evidence is available. My theory of "conditional
irrelevance" focuses on evidence that reduces rather than increases the probative value of
other evidence.
103. See Roger C. Park, Characterat the Crossroads,49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 723 n.13
(1998); see also id. (referring to an unsupported statistic reported by Alan Dershowitz on a
television program that "only one in a thousand batterers goes on to kill" during an act of
spousal abuse).
104. Based on Dershowitz's (probably flawed) assumption about the relation between
spousal battery and abuse, using his own calculations, statistician I.J. Good estimated that
if we know that a man is a batterer and that his wife has been murdered, "the probability
is one-third to one-half that a battering husband murdered his wife." Id
105. I.J. Good calculated that based on a batterer's actual "lifetime probability of
murder," the likelihood is .9 that the batterer whose wife has been murdered was himself
the one who killed her. Id
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kill his wife in the future, for instance, the odds of his doing so would
be much lower than the odds that the batterer whose wife has been
murdered was in fact the murderer.
Just as there are facts that can make the relatively irrelevant
highly relevant, there are also facts that can reduce or eliminate the
relevance of a given piece of evidence. For example, most homicides°6
are committed by people who are of the same race as their victims.'
Learning that the victim of a homicide is African American would
thus be relevant to determining the race of the perpetrator.
Accordingly, detectives might use evidence of the victim's race to
help guide their investigation.
Once an eyewitness claims that she saw the attack in which the
victim was killed, however, and that the assailant was a white man
with blonde hair and blue eyes, the fact that the victim is African
American is no longer probative of the assailant's race. To urge the
conclusion that the killer was African American, one would have to
attack the perception, memory, or honesty of the eyewitness rather
than pointing to the fact that the victim was African American.
Similarly, in our blood-donation example above, until we know
that John has accused George of forcing him to donate blood, John's
history of giving blood certainly increases the odds that John
voluntarily chose to give blood on this occasion. Once we know that
John has made the accusation, however, John's donation history
ceases to be probative. The two primary variables in determining
what happened become John's insincerity and George's violence.
This discussion teaches an important lesson about the rape shield
law. Evidence that a woman has chosen to have sex with many men
in the past is not relevant to whether she consented on the occasion
on which she claims she was raped. Once she has made an
accusation, the fact of that accusation becomes salient and the
relevant propensities become her propensity for making false
accusations about rape or about other serious matters and the
Any evidence
defendant's propensity for committing rapes.
suggesting a predisposition to engage in sexual activity would
accordingly be irrelevant and just as illegitimate as the evidence in the
blood donation example that John had previously donated blood on
many occasions.107
106. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Homicide Trends in the United States,
http:lwww.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/pub/presslhtius.pr (Jan. 2, 1999) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) ("From 1976 though 1997,85 percent of white murder victims were
killed by whites and 94 percent of black victims were killed by blacks.").
107. Arguably, this should hold true even under the circumstances covered by the
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One might defend the use of such evidence, whether of sexual or
blood donation propensity, on the ground that that its relevance is not
absolutely zero. If the victim tried to rule out even the possibility of
consent by arguing, for example, that she would never agree to 10have
8
sex or to donate blood, such evidence would surely be relevant. If
there is an inclination and therefore a potential for consent, the
victim's consent to sex or blood donation is not ruled out. There is at
least a theoretical plausibility to the defendant's story that there
simply would not be if consent were utterly out of the question.
This objection is partially correct and may animate scholars who
press for the admissibility of sexual history in consent-defense rape
cases. The absence of any propensity to consent would be highly
relevant. It would virtually rule out the possibility that the event was
consensual and thereby eliminate even the need to assess the victim's
The presence of such a propensity, however, is
credibility.
nonetheless virtually irrelevant when there has been a rape charge.
That is, it is irrelevant except to the extent that it allows for the
possibility of consent, a possibility that the victim in most cases does
not deny. She does not, in other words, say that she could not have
consented but swears instead that on this occasion, she did not
consent. Under such circumstances, the relevance of an inclination to
consent is vanishingly small. For this reason, I speak of it as
irrelevant.
C. ConditionalIrrelevanceand Ambiprobativity
Others before me have attempted to argue the irrelevance of
sexual promiscuity in rape cases. Prior arguments have been
unconvincing, however, for making flawed assumptions about what
makes rape cases different. As mentioned above, 09 some have
denied that promiscuity is a meaningful dimension of human
behavior. This denial does not seem well-founded, however, given
existing exception to the rape shield law for evidence about a victim's previous consensual
relationship with the defendant. Her having consented to have sex with him in the past
does not make her more likely to be leveling a false rape accusation against him on this
occasion. Evidence about a pre-existing relationship between the defendant and the
victim may be a necessary part of providing the context for the events in question, but
specifying that their relationship was sexual need not be. The suggestion, implicit in the
rule, that consent on prior occasions makes the victim's complaint less likely to be true, is
therefore flawed, for the same reasons as I outline in criticizing the notion that sexual
propensity evidence is relevant to rape cases generally.
108. Proving that the victim would never act in a particular way mirrors the prodefendant character evidence exception in Rule 404 and would similarly open the door for
evidence that the "would never do that" claim is inconsistent with the facts.
109. See supranote 92 and accompanying text.
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that people do seem to differ from one another in this, as in other,
inclinations.
A different commentator, Professor Roger Park, has made a
more nuanced argument for the irrelevance of promiscuity evidence
in rape cases. Park reaches his conclusion through a concept he calls
"ambiprobativity," the position that evidence that a person is sexually
active makes both consent and rape more likely and therefore-on
net-lacks the relevance that would justify its admission. Though I
sympathize with the result reached by Park, I reject the theory of
ambiprobativity.
Professors David Bryden and Sonja Lengnick more elaborately
develop the argument that sexual propensity evidence is
ambiprobative in rape cases. They base this theory on the fact that
"sexual permissiveness is associated with rape victimization." 0 As
stated elsewhere by Bryden, this approach holds that "promiscuous
women, though more likely to consent to sex than other women, are
also more likely to be raped."'
The ambiprobativity argument works like this: If we know that a
woman is unusually sexually active then, knowing nothing else, on
any given day, we know that she is more likely than her less active
sister to have consented to sexual activity. This inference seems
legitimately to follow from the general proposition that past conduct
is relevant evidence of future conduct." Though some scholars have,
as Bryden and Lengnick note, downplayed the relevance of a
"propensity to consent,' " 3 it seems apparent that across the universe
of people, individuals' sexual proclivities fall along a continuum.
Evidence of one's past behavior, in this as in other areas, is
therefore-knowing nothing else-helpful in predicting one's future
110. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1357.
111. Bryden & Park, supra note 28, at 570.
112. See Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript): Some
Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 7 BEHAV. SC. & L. 521, 532 (1989) ("[B]ehavior
science research.., shows that, by and large, the best way to predict anybody's behavior is
his behavior in the past."); see also Klassen & O'Connor, supra note 36, at 145. But see
Orenstein, supra note 36, at 670.
113. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40,at 1333 ("Some scholars point out that the
woman's consent to sex on previous occasions does not 'prove' consent on the occasion in
question."); see, e.g., Garth E.Hire, Holding Husbandsand Lovers Accountable for Rape:
Eliminating the "Defendant" Exception of Rape Shield Laws, 5 S.CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 591, 601 (1996) (arguing that past consent to intercourse with a man does
not increase the odds of later consent to intercourse with that man); Tanya Bagne
Marcketti, Rape Shield Laws: Do They Shield the Children?,78 IOWA L. REV. 751, 754
(1993) ("Rape shield statutes evolved from society's recognition that a rape victim's prior
sexual history is irrelevant to issues of consent.").
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behavior. It is also helpful, for the same reasons, in ascertaining one's
past behavior, given no other information.
In addition to raising the odds of a consensual encounter, the
ambiprobativity argument points out that being sexually "permissive"
positively correlates with the likelihood of being raped. This
increased risk of rape might result from a tendency for the woman
who has many different sexual partners to place herself more
frequently in potentially dangerous situations, circumstances under
which a man would have the opportunity to rape her if he wished to
do so. Thus, the population of women who we can predict will
consent more frequently than others is also the population of women
who we can predict will be raped more frequently than others. In the
context of a rape trial in which a defendant raises the defense of
consent, propensity to consent "cuts both ways" and thereforegenerally-does not aid the trier of fact. 4
The ambiprobativity point about sexual propensity is insightful
and useful from a rape prevention perspective, but it is ultimately not
relevant to the consent-defense rape case. It is only when we know
nothing else that sexual predisposition evidence is probative of both
consent and rape at the same time.
Consider the case in which we know that a woman is sexually
active and that she had intercourse on a particular day, but we know
nothing else about the encounter (such as whether or not it was
consensual). Knowing nothing else, the sexually active woman is
more likely to have consented to intercourse in a given encounter
than her less active sister, because she is more likely to consent in
general and nothing that we know about the situation removes it from
the general run of situations. She is not, however, more likely to have
been raped. This is because the only reason, on our hypothesis, that
her frequent sexual encounters previously increased her chances of
being raped is that she would more regularly find herself in a
vulnerable position vis- -vis men who might potentially be rapists.
Once we know that both the sexually active woman and the relatively
"chaste" woman had intercourse on a particular occasion, we know
the outcome that past sexual activity would have been there to
predict, namely, the likelihood that each woman would be in a
vulnerable position vis- -vis a potentially predatory male. Therefore,
it is no longer the case that the woman's inclination to engage in

114. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1341 (arguing that a jury has "no basis
in common experience for choosing between the conflicting inferences" that can be drawn
from evidence of an inclination to consent to sex).
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consensual sex makes both consent and rape more likely. It now only
increases the odds of consent.
A woman who rarely consents to sex accordingly is less likely to
be raped in general only because she is less likely on any given day
(and therefore over time) to find herself in the vulnerable position of
being alone with a man who wishes to commit rape. There is
therefore no reason to think that the less sexually active woman
would be any less vulnerable to an intending rapist than the more
sexually active woman, once each of them is alone with a man and
therefore vulnerable to rape on a specific occasion. The evidence of
sexual predisposition thus loses its ambiprobativity once we know
that there was intercourse on a particular occasion. It then becomes
probative in only one direction, increasing the odds that for the more
sexually active woman, the sex that we know took place was
consensual.
As we observed by analogy in the blood donation case, learning
in addition to the fact of intercourse that the complainant has accused
the defendant of having raped her on the particular occasion
eliminates the relevance of her sexual predisposition in determining
the odds that she consented to the defendant's advances. This is
because once there is an accusation in place, there is no reason to
expect the sexually active accuser to be any more likely than the
"chaste" accuser to have falsified this accusation. Her sexual history
thus goes from being ambiprobative (when we know nothing else at
all) to being uniprobative (when we know that intercourse took
place) to being completely irrelevant (when we know both of
intercourse and of her rape accusation). Her propensity to engage in
consensual sex is, in other words, conditionally irrelevant to
demonstrating that she was likely to have consented to a specific
sexual encounter that she claims was rape.
Consider an example illustrating why ambiprobativity is illusory
rape trials. Assume that the following two
consent-defense
in
propositions are true: (1) a person who goes to the hospital regularly
is more likely to be subject to an experimental procedure without his
consent than a person who goes to the hospital infrequently; and (2) a
person who goes to the hospital regularly is also more likely to
consent to an experimental procedure than a person who goes to the
hospital infrequently. Now consider the case of Bart.
Bart goes to the hospital regularly for medical care. In the
absence of other information, this fact about Bart increases the odds
that he will be subjected to an experimental procedure without his
consent on any given day, but it also increases the odds that he will
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voluntarily consent to an experimental procedure on any given day.
His frequent hospital visits are thus ambiprobative if we know
nothing about the day in question.
If we look behind the ambiprobativity, however, we see that each
of the two relevances operates at a different level of abstraction.
Bart's frequent visits to the hospital reveal an attitude on his part
(perhaps a trust in doctors) that makes him more likely to consent to
experimental procedures. The reason that his frequent hospital visits
are also probative of the odds of his suffering nonconsensual
procedures, however, has nothing to do with his attitude but instead
results from the fact that frequent visits to the hospital mean frequent
opportunities for unscrupulous medical personnel to subject a patient
to such procedures. Bart's regular visits to the hospital thus help us to
predict nonconsensual procedures not because they reveal something
about the odds that he will do something. Instead, they reveal the
regularity with which he places himself in circumstances in which he is
vulnerable to the wrongdoing of others. To see the significance of
this distinction between types of relevance, let us add a few facts to
the mix.
Once we know that on a given day, Bart underwent an
experimental procedure in the hospital, his frequent prior hospital
visits no longer increase the odds that he suffered a nonconsensual
procedure. He is no more vulnerable to nonconsensual procedures
on that day, in other words, than another patient (Marge) who is also
in the hospital but who is not a regular visitor there. The fact that
Bart is a frequent hospital visitor is here relevant in only one
direction: it increases the odds that he consented to his experimental
procedure relative to the odds that Marge, the infrequent hospital
visitor, consented to her experimental procedure."'
Now add a third fact, that Bart claims that the experimental
procedure that he underwent on the day in question was carried out
without his consent. His doctor, Illbe, says that on the morning
before the surgery she sat with Bart, explained everything involved,
and Bart responded that he was happy for the chance to undergo this
potentially path-breaking treatment. Bart says that the only thing Dr.
Illbe told him that morning was that he did not look well and that she

115. Another analogy is that one who frequently flips coins (call him Flipper) is far
more likely to get a Tails at some point than someone who very infrequently flips coins
(call him Unflipper). Once we know, however, that Flipper and Unflipper each flipped a
coin last night, the fact that Flipper also flipped lots of coins in the past, while Unflipper
did not, makes it no more likely that Flipper will get Tails than that Unflipper will.
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would see what she could do for him. Bart did not, on this account,
say anything at all that would authorize an experimental procedure.
It is no longer useful for us to know that Bart goes to the hospital
regularly. The fact that he asserts that he did not consent to the
experimental procedure on the particular day in question eliminates
the probative value of his regular hospital visits. Even though the
regular hospital visitor is, in general, more likely to consent to
experimental procedures, there is no reason to expect that he is more
likely to claim falsely that consent was not given than the less regular
hospital visitor. What we would want to know about Bart and Marge
is whether they regularly make false claims or accusations. If they do,
then that increases the probability that they are making false
accusations now. If there is no such predisposition in Bart, then we
would not expect him to make a false claim, regardless of whether or
not he generally consents to procedures. The same is true for Marge.
In addition to learning whether Bart or Marge has a propensity for
lying or making false accusations, we would want to find out whether
Dr. Illbe has a propensity for performing experimental procedures
without her patients' consent. It is these two propensities that are
relevant to the inquiry at hand.
Now return to the sexually active woman and the consentdefense rape case. Assume that we possess three facts about her
circumstances:
first, she is sexually active; second, she had
intercourse last night; third, she claims that it was rape. I have argued
that, at this point, the fact of her propensity to consent to sex is no
longer probative in either direction on the question of whether she
was raped. We already know that she was exposed to a heightened
risk last night. Therefore, her prior exposure to that risk does not
make rape more likely than it is for the more "chaste." We also know
that she claims that the intercourse that occurred last night was rape.
This accusation places her experience last night into a relatively small
class of sexual encounters that are not representative of the class of
all sexual encounters-those the subject of a rape allegation. Of
course, the jury has to decide whether to believe her accusation
beyond a reasonable doubt. Treating the fact of her accusation as a
piece of evidence, however, just as we might treat the fact of the
defendant's denial or the fact of her physical injuries, there is no
reason to expect that by virtue of her sexual proclivities, she is more
likely to bring a false rape accusation against a consensual partner
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than a less sexually experienced woman would be." 6 In the presence
of her accusation, then, her sexual character becomes irrelevant.
CONCLUSION

This Article has proposed that we divide criminal trials into
"whodunit" and "what was done" scenarios. We saw that this
dichotomy gives us a means of distinguishing cases in which both
parties should be barred from introducing derogatory character
evidence about the defendant and the victim ("whodunit") from cases
in which both parties should be free to introduce such evidence
("what was done").
In the "whodunit" context, we noted that anti-defendant
propensity evidence appears far more relevant than it actually is.
This disparity results from the absence within the courtroom of other
Under these
suspects with similar traits or inclinations.
a defendant
in
character
circumstances, for example, a violent
charged with a violent crime is very damning, even though he is only
one of countless violent people in the world who could have
committed this offense. Compounding the gap between apparent and
actual relevance is the probability that the police selected the
defendant in the first instance because of his prior criminal history.
The apparently remarkable coincidence of his propensity and his
status as a defendant thus turns out to be no coincidence at all.
In the "what was done" scenario, we observed that apparent and
actual relevance line up more equitably than they do in the
"whodunit" case. For the defendant and the victim in the "what was
done" case, there is no question that these individuals were both
involved in the charged transaction. The only dispute is over their
respective roles within that transaction. Deciding such cases would
thus typically come down to deciding whether or not the defendant
committed a crime rather than deciding whether it was the defendant
who committed an uncontroversially criminal act.
116. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 26, at 492 (discussing the "sorry sexist
tradition" prior to the rape shield laws of introducing evidence of the victim's sexual
history in rape prosecutions to determine her credibility and likelihood of consent and
asserting "[t]hat evidence of sexual behavior has no bearing on credibility standing by
itself").
Indeed, we might actually expect that, to the extent that a "chaste" woman might
have a greater incentive to protect her reputation for chastity than would a more sexually
active woman, the probabilities of false accusation would go in the opposite direction. I
have no reason to accept this two-dimensional view, but its potential plausibility
demonstrates the importance of adding the rape accusation fact to the mix of data in
calculating the odds.
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Because all potential culprits are located in the courtroom in
such cases, defendant and victim propensity evidence provides highly
relevant data for choosing between the two competing versions of
what happened. We saw how information about a defendant's
negative character traits can significantly increase the plausibility of
the guilt hypothesis. Further, we saw that negative victim propensity
evidence, which the criminal defendant is (and ought to be) free to
offer, has no greater relevance than negative defendant propensity
evidence.
Focusing on rape cases and Rules 412-414, we then made two
discoveries. First, we saw that consent-defense rape defendants are
the same as other "what was done" defendants in that propensity
evidence will be very useful in determining whether or not the
defendant is guilty. Second, we saw how consent-defense rape victims
both resemble and differ from most other victims in "what was done"
cases.
We next analyzed whether it made sense, in light of the
similarities and differences, to suppress and, thus, treat rape victim
sexual propensity differently from victim character in other criminal
cases. In the course of this analysis, we first rejected the notion that
promiscuity is a meaningless construct. There is no reason to doubt
that people would exhibit some consistency in this as in other areas of
life. After accepting the hypothesis that sexual propensity might be
an authentic character trait rather than simply a misogynist myth, we
next considered whether knowing of a victim's sexual propensity
helps the finder of fact decide consent-defense rape cases correctly.
We examined the Park, Bryden, and Lengnick ambiprobativity
theory of why, even though the trait of sexual propensity may exist, it
is nonetheless irrelevant to consent-defense rape trials because it
makes both consent and rape more likely to have occurred. We
found the ambiprobativity hypothesis unpersuasive, because while it
is true that sexual activity correlates with both rape and consensual
intercourse, this dual relevance evaporates once we learn additional
information about the accuser's interactions with the accused, going
from ambiprobativity to uniprobativity (when intercourse is known)
to irrelevance (when intercourse and accusation are known). We
analyzed the logical weight of promiscuity evidence in a rape trial. In
doing so, we saw that in rape trials in which we know that intercourse
took place and that the victim claims that this intercourse was rape, a
victim's sexual propensity no longer helps a jury to determine
whether or not the defendant raped her. I coined the phrase
"conditional irrelevance" to describe this phenomenon.
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After rejecting the relevance of victim promiscuity evidence in
rape cases, we considered whether this irrelevance means that in
consent-defense rape trials, unlike in all other "what was done" trials,
victim propensity should be inadmissible. In posing this question, we
came to see that victim character can be highly relevant in rape cases,
but that the character trait in question is not promiscuity. By
examining a series of examples, we concluded that victim propensity
evidence ought to be admissible in consent-defense rape cases just as
in other "what was done" cases, but that it is the victim's inclination
towards dishonesty and false accusation rather than her inclination to
engage in consensual sex that sheds light on the truth or falsity of her
accusation.
In considering the merits of character evidence in criminal trials,
we have omitted a discussion of one feature of the problem, namely,
the relative necessity for the prosecution to introduce character
evidence in prosecuting "whodunit" versus "what was done" crimes.
Jurors in "whodunit" cases seem capable of convicting a defendant if
there is sufficient case-specific evidence of guilt, even if they do not
hear any evidence about the defendant's character. In a robbery trial,
for example, if the victim points out the defendant and testifies that
he is the one who committed the robbery, jurors are willing to believe
that the victim is speaking accurately and truthfully. Until recently,
of cases in which the primary eyewitnesses
this was especially 11true
7
officers.
were police
In the "what was done" case, by contrast, jurors are inclined to
vote for an acquittal in the absence of evidence demonstrating a bad
character on the part of the defendant." 8 Thus, in addition to being
more probative in "what was done" than in "whodunit" cases,
character evidence about the defendant may often be necessary in
"what was done" cases as a condition of conviction. Though it is
"convenient" for me that both logic and necessity point to the same
evidentiary approach, it is worth asking why, in the absence of
character evidence, it is more difficult to obtain a conviction in a
"what was done" case than it is to obtain a conviction in a "whodunit"
case. Alternatively, we might ask why the default is that, in the
117. Jurors have in the past tended to believe police officers' testimony in criminal
trials. See Deon J. Nossell, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by Law
Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 246 (1993). This trend
may be changing, however. See David Rohde, A Hard Choice on Taking the Stand, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18,2000, at B4.
118. See, e.g., Quindlen, supra note 4 (arguing that the acquittal of William Kennedy
Smith was due substantially to the exclusion of evidence that demonstrated his character).
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presence of equally sufficient evidence, the jury might convict the
"whodunit" defendant and acquit the "what was done" defendant,
such that character evidence about bad defendants becomes essential
to the prosecutor's case in the latter category.119
Some commentators suggest that the source of the discrepancy is
the "he said/she said" or "swearing contest" problem.1 2° Because
consent-defense rape cases seem often to present this problem, it
might appear to account well for the difficulty prosecutors have
(absent propensity evidence) in winning convictions in consentdefense rape cases.
As it turns out, however, this difficulty in obtaining convictions
extends beyond consent-defense rape cases to "what was done" cases
more generally. 121 Perhaps, then, the "swearing contest" problem
applies more generally as well. Is it then true that in "what was done"
cases, the defendant and victim are engaged in a "swearing contest"
that leaves juries unable to decide between the two stories without
character evidence as the tie-breaker? While this explanation has
some surface plausibility, it is not ultimately persuasive. Criminal
cases always turn on the relative credibility of defense and
prosecution witnesses. Even when there is an abundance of physical
evidence, juries must decide which witnesses' explanations for the
physical evidence are the most compelling. Physical evidence must
also, moreover, be authenticated, interpreted, and presented through
witnesses. For these reasons, witness credibility remains important to
most criminal cases. In addition, in "whodunit" cases, where identity
is an issue, eyewitnesses can easily make a mistake about the culprit's
identity, and social scientists tell us that such errors are quite
common. 22 In the "what was done" cases, by and large, this
119. Prosecutors report that it is indeed much more difficult to get a conviction in a
"what was done" case, such as a consent-defense rape, than in other cases. See Bryden &
Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1324.
120. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 26, at 472 (observing that there are
often no " 'neutral' observers" in acquaintance rape cases, and thus the defendant and
victim are left to contradict each other); Scott, supra note 30, at 1743 ("Trials involving sex
crimes usually end up as 'swearing matches' between the accuser and the accused forcing
the jury to decide who is more credible." (citing Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar Acts in
Prosecutionsfor Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F. 307, 317 (1993))).
121. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 40, at 1324.
122. See, e.g., Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A
New Pairof Glassesfor the Jury,32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1017-18 (1995) (noting that
psychological studies indicate that memory works in stages, each of which can be affected
by factors that "alter a witness's perception of an event and render it unreliable"); Harvey
Wallace, Victims of Crimes: Reporting, Identification & Values, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 669, 673-74 (1993) (reviewing MARTIN S. GREENBERG & R. BARRY
RUBACK, AFTER THE CRIME: VICTIM DECISION MAKING (1992)) (discussing the various
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perceptual weakness does not arise to interfere with the accuracy of

the testimony.
If we look more closely at the "swearing contest" idea, moreover,
it appears not to be much of a contest in either the "whodunit" or the
"what was done" case. The defendant's testimony that he is innocent
is overdetermined and predictable. 23 The defendant consistently has
a strong incentive to swear to his innocence, whether or not he is
innocent and whether or not he is honest. Such an incentive does not
generally taint the testimony of victims, particularly victims in rape
cases, because it was their choice to bring criminal charges and serve
as witnesses. For this reason, any "swearing contest" is lopsided
when the criminal defendant is one of the two "contestants." So we
return to our question-what makes "what was done" cases so
difficult for prosecutors to win?
Though there is no way to answer this question definitively, I
believe that the narrative quality of the criminal trial creates juries'
distinct reactions to "whodunit" and to "what was done" cases,
respectively. When a criminal trial begins, the prosecution and
defense attorneys present opening statements that contain competing

stories from which the jury must select. 24

This is somewhat in

keeping with one tradition of novels and films in which the reader or
viewer can select from a series of potential endings the one she likes
the best. 125 Though the particulars vary from case to case, two very
studies indicating that "the stress of the crime can significantly affect the perception and
memory of the victim" and indicating that "suggestions by authority figures such as police
influence the identification process"); see also Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress
"Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 883, 892 (2000) ("The vagaries of eyewitness
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of
mistaken identification.").
123. Whether the defendant actually testifies is, of course, determined in part by
whether there is a prior criminal history that might come into evidence to impeach the
defendant's credibility. As commentators have pointed out, this obstacle to testifying
distorts the process. See Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule of
Evidence 609: A Look at How JurorsReally Misuse PriorConvictionEvidence, 48 DRAKE
L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1999) ("While a defendant always has a right to testify, he would feel
unduly restrained from doing so if he had prior convictions."); Park, supra note 103, at 756
("[U]nder the current rules the defendant will sometimes choose not to testify because of
fear that testimony will lead to impeachment with prior convictions.").
124. In some criminal trials, of course, the defense does not put on a case but simply
challenges the story of the prosecutor. There is in such cases one story, told by the
prosecutor, and a challenge to that story by the defense. As we shall see, however, the
challenge generally does offer an implicit story that the jury can accept or reject.
125. See, e.g., FREQUENCY (Takashi Seida/New Line Cinema 2000) (setting out a timetravel plot in which the main character is able to communicate with people from his past
and thereby change his own current reality); SLIDING DOORS (Miramax/Paramount 1998)
(setting out two parallel realities that differ based on the main character's having caught a
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different kinds of competing narratives repeatedly emerge as a
feature of each distinct scenario on trial.
Consider the "whodunit" scenario. The prosecution tells a story
in which a terrible crime has been committed, and the culprit is sitting
in the courtroom waiting for the jury to judge him guilty or not guilty.
If the jury convicts, then-in the prosecution's narrative-the culprit
suffers just punishment for his actions, and closure is achieved. If the
jury acquits, on the other hand, then the guilty person gets away with
his crime.
The defense in a "whodunit" trial tells a story in which the
defendant has been wrongly charged and someone else committed
the crime. If the jury convicts, it punishes an innocent person. If it
acquits, then an innocent person is free, but a crime still goes
unavenged. Both defense stories are fairly depressing: in both, a
terrible crime has been committed, and the criminal will go
unpunished.
The jury can do nothing to change either of these facts.
Therefore, if it can, the jury will choose to reject this set of
alternatives in favor of the prosecution's happier narrative: although
a terrible crime has taken place, it is in the jury's power to avenge
that crime and thus to achieve retributive justice. The guilty verdict
represents the jury's embrace of the happiest available narrativethat of the prosecutor. In the "whodunit" scenario, the jury does not
have the option of deciding that there was no crime, because
everyone acknowledges that there was one.
Now consider the "what was done" scenario. The prosecution
tells a story in which a terrible crime has occurred, and the culprit is
in the courtroom waiting for judgment. If the jury convicts, then the
criminal is brought to justice; if it acquits, then he is not. Unlike the
prosecutor, the defense tells a story in the "what was done" case quite
different from what it told in the "whodunit" case: The defense
asserts that no crime has taken place. If the jury acquits, it finds that
there was no crime, there was no victim, and there accordingly need
be no retribution. If the jury convicts, on the defense version, then an
innocent man is unjustly punished. The most attractive in this group
of possible stories is the story of innocence and acquittal. It is truly a
train versus her having missed that same train, and exploring the interaction between the
two simultaneous realities); RUN LOLA RUN (Arte 1998) (taking the film's viewer through
more than one possible outcome, each of which is dependent on an initial choice made by
the main character); see also SHEAR MADNESS (Cranberry Productions, currently being
performed in Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.) (allowing the
audience to vote on an ending to be acted out).
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happy ending if there was no crime at all, happier even than the crime
that is avenged by a conviction. Thus, my hypothesis is that as
between the prosecution and defense narratives in "what was done"
cases, the jury prefers to believe the defense and to bring back an
acquittal. This offers the happiest possible ending.
If I am correct about the jury's motivations, a level of denial is
intrinsic to this enterprise. After all, if a crime did take place, the jury
cannot alter that truth simply by refusing to believe it and acting
accordingly. It is worse, moreover, to deny a crime that did happen
than it is to acknowledge it and punish the perpetrator. 126 Similarly, if
an innocent person is on trial for an unquestionably criminal act, the
jury cannot change the fact that the true culprit is at large simply by
convicting the defendant that is before it. It is accordingly worse to
convict the innocent person (and thus, incidentally, also to ensure the
continuing freedom of the guilty party) than it is to acquit him.
The jury, however, might feel (as in audience-participation
theater) that it plays a role in constructing and shaping the truth.127 If
it is possible to find no crime, the jury does so and believes that no
crime has been committed. If it is not, then the jury brings the culprit
to justice. To that extent, the jury absorbs the idea that legal "truth"
and actual "truth" are one and the same. Like the common law judge
who "finds" the law by consulting his own view of right and wrong,
the juror chooses to "find" the facts that add up to a story of justice
with a happy ending. 128

126. Holocaust denial represents an extreme example of selecting denial over
acknowledgment. See generally DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST:
THE GROWING ASSAULT ON TRUTH AND MEMORY (1993) (analyzing the beliefs of
Holocaust revisionists who deny the occurrence of the Holocaust and arguing that such
persons are dangerous); cf. Sherry F. Colb, Words That Deny, Devalue, and Punish:
JudicialReponses to Fetus Envy, 72 B.U. L. REv. 101, 106-07 (1992) (discussing denial
and devaluation as alternative emotional strategies for reacting to a threatening
phenomenon, both of which have a similar impact in diminishing the suffering of an
oppressed group).
127. See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1363 (1985) (noting that jurors may see
their role in the courtroom as that of making a statement that decides the events that
occurred).
128. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-40 (1986) (describing the "chain
novel," in which a number of authors write a series of episodes or chapters based on what
the author directly before has written). Dworkin draws an analogy between authoring a
chain novel and engaging in the process of judicial decision-making. A judge knows what
other judges have decided and must finish the current "story" before her by making a fair
decision which considers the facts presented as well as previous decisions by other authors.
See id.
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If this theory is correct, the introduction of character evidence
alters the jury's attachment to the happy ending narrative by
complicating the picture. If jurors must choose between no crime and
punished crime, they might pick no crime. However, if they come to
view the victim as a credible, honest, and believable person and the
defendant as a cruel and violent person, then the "no crime" outcome
comes to represent a potential judgment of the victim. In other
words, character evidence about defendant and victim focuses the
jury on the fact that someone did something reprehensible in this case
and that the jury-in its verdict-will officially declare who that
someone is. The incentive to get it right comes to represent the
happier ending than the embrace of a happy illusion to the detriment
of an innocent victim.
As we have seen in our discussion, "what was done" cases are
very much about the people involved in a transaction, about what the
people were likely to have done and to have said. This is why getting
to know the character of these people is both relevant and often
There is
essential to an informed jury's deliberative process.
therefore every reason to distinguish between negative character
evidence in "whodunit" cases, where it should be excluded, and in
"what was done" cases, where character evidence is often illuminating
without raising the specter of unfairly singling out a defendant from a
large class of "bad" people.

